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INTRODUCTION

The rapid influx of homesteaders into Montana after
1909 caused a dramatic change in the structure of the entire
state.

This change revolved around the dryland farming pro

cedures undertaken on scant 320 acre plots.

The newcomers

to the Great Plains region built small communities criss
crossed by a patchwork of railroads.

These honyockers al

tered not only the state*s transportation system, but its
politics, agriculture, educational institutions and banking
facilities.
From 1917 to 1925 the state underwent still further
change due to the drought conditions.

These dry years were

not confined to Montana but occurred in North and South
Dakota, Idaho, and portions of Wyoming and Washington.

The

catastrophe was very complex, but its most significant aspect
was the massive failure of hundreds of banks.

These banks

left thousands of homesteaders penniless, forcing them to
migrate from the Great Plains destitute and with broken spirits.
No historian has ever chronicled this tragedy in its
entirety.

Its very complexity— drought, falling beef and

wheat prices, loss of European markets, uncontrolled bank
failures, years of despair and the subsequent disenchantment
of the farmers— has made such a study extremely difficult.

1

Until each facet of this disaster has been thoroughly re
searched no historian can accurately write the whole story.
This thesis is one example of such research and is confinad
to a single aspect of that cataclysm— the failure of one of
Montana's commercial banks.
No history has ever been written that involved the
failure of a Montana bank during this era.

After a bank

failed its papers and correspondence were burned.

Conse

quently, historians have been forced to rely on state bank
ing records.

For this single reason the Gilman State Bank

Papers are of major importance.
In evaluating the failure of the Gilman bank several
essential questions must be answered.

Why did the bank fail

Did it fail for primarily the same reasons other Montana
banks failed?

If so, can this failure be considered repre

sentative of the majority of the banks in the state?

Once

these questions are answered generalizations can be made
concerning other banks that folded in Montana during the
1920*s.

These generalizations are important if one is to

attempt even a brief understanding of the failure of a s.ingl
institution.

More importantly the cost of human emotion can

be examined and the effects it rendered can be applied to
other bank studies.
The first chapter is a terse explanation about the
homesteaders and how they got to Montana.

The chapter takes

3
into account the effect these newcomers had on the state’s
banking system.

Conversely, the failure of these institu

tions forced bankruptcy on thousands of inexperienced farmers.
This groundwork is essential for the reader to even hazard a
guess at why a bank failed.

The chapters which follow deal

explicitly with the social, economic, loan and financial
factors that caused the b a n k ’s failure.
This thesis does not presume to give the answers to all
of the questions raised concerning the failure of M o n t a n a ’s
banks.

This is the study of a single bank.

The conclusions

reached, however, can hopefully be applied to other banks
that closed.

With these answers another piece can be fitted

into a puzzle of mammoth proportions.

Jeffrey L. Cuoniff
October, 1971

CHAPTER I
R A I NBOW’S END:

HONYOCKER YEARS

OF PROSPERITY AND BANKRUPTCY

I
They were called ’’homesteaders,” ”nesters,” ’’scissorbills,’’ "honyockers,” and a dozen other names.

But no

matter which title they were known by they came to Montana
with hope for a new and prosperous life.

This was the

attitude of thousands of easterners and European immigrants
who settled in Montana during the homestead era (1909-1925).
These newcomers to the West came with little knowledge
about their new homes, but soon became indoctrinated to
the rugged life of prairie farming.

Hope and despair b e 

came their watchwords and Mo n t a n a ’s history during this
period is filled with accounts of their struggles and tri
umphs.

The homesteader had arrived!

’’Some of them were chasing a rainbow;
thought they were getting ’free land.’

some of them

And almost all of

them had been subjected to a promotion and propaganda cam
paign of great proportions.”^

Advertisements depicted Montana

as the land of milk and honey where the poor man had an

^K. Ross Toole, Montana:
An Uncommon Land (Norman,
Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959),
230.
Hereafter
cited as Toole, M ontana:
An Uncommon Land.

4

equal opportunity in developing his fortune.

One particu

lar poster widely displayed throughout the East showed a
plow being drawn across a Montana field f u m i n g over a furrow of golden coins.

9

*

This was quite typical of advertising

used to entice these newcomers to move west and settle in
Montana's paradise.
The railroads played a major role in stimulating in
terest in western agriculture.

"Usually the literature con

tained an endorsement by the governor and an agricultural
official as to productive value of eastern Montana lands,
and alluring illustrations of various phases of farming,
new buildings, farm equipment, and livestock.
The Milwaukee Railroad, through its poster and pamphlet
campaigp, achieved great success in bringing thousands of
immigrants to eastern and central Montana.

One of these

pamphlets emphasized the exceptionally good soil in the
Deer Lodge Valley region.

It vividly described the rich

black soil that ranged in depth from ten inches to ten feet.
The brochure did not fail to mention the rich elements in

^Carl Newton Abbott, Montana in the Making (Billings,
Mont.:
The Gazette Printing Company, 1934)>
385-6.
Here
after cited as Abbott, Montana in the M a k i n g .
^Charles A. Dalich,
"Dry Farming Promotion in Eastern
Montana:
1907-1916”
(unpublished M A thesis, Archives,
University of Montana, 1968),
58.
Hereafter cited as
Dalich, "Dry Farming Promotion, 1907-1916."

the soil

(oxygen, nitrogen, potash, etc.) and its capa

bility of producing enormous yields of winter wheat, oats,
barley, flax and field peas without any appreciable exhaustion
of the soil.^
Another booklet published by the Milwaukee described
the climate of Montana as one of the most healthful in the
world.

It stated that "...there were few days during the en

tire year in which outdoor work could not be done in comfort,"
and stressed that "...no one need fear the winters of Montana.
The Northern Pacific, with its vast land acquisitions,
offered many immigrants an opportunity for a new life on
cheap rich l a n d .

The land grant which the government made

to the Northern Pacific gave the railroad the title to
every other section (all the odd-numbered sections) for
twenty miles each side of the right-of-way.

The railroad

sold its odd-numbered sections to land companies who in turn
found it easy to sell to settlers since many of the evennumbered sections had already been settled.

Townships

rapidly populated in this manner.

^Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway, "The Deer
Lodge Valley" (Chicago:
Poole Bros. Railway Printers, n.d.),
•^Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway, "Montana:
Its Resources and Opportunities" (Chicago:
Poole Bros.
Railway Printers, n.d.),
4.
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The Great Northern, plotted by the visions of Jim
Hill, opened the state to farming on the northern plains.
H i l l Ts success can be measured by the fact that homestead
ers settled 42 percent of Montana from 1910 to 1922,
percent of which was unfit for grain c r o p s ) A s

(80

one noted

Montana author put it, "Montana, was after all Jim H i l l ’s
state."^

This, however, may be stretching a little far the

importance of one m a n ’s ventures and his effect on the
settlement of Montana.
In any case, the importance of the railroads in bring
ing homesteaders to the state cannot be overlooked.
came in cars which carried livestock.

They

Some even traveled

as stowaways.

The majority of them, though, came on immi

grant trains.

"The honyocker rented a freight car (St. Paul

Joseph Kinsey Howard, Montana;
High. Wide, and Hand
some (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943)*
168-9.
Hereafter cited as Howard, Montana:
High. Wide, and Hand
some . In these dozen years the rural population of every
county except Broadwater, Park, and Lewis and Clark more
than doubled.
Abbott, Montana in the M a k i n g . 33 7.
^Ibid. It was Joseph Kinsey Howard’s contention that
Jim H i l l ’s vision of the settlement of the northern plains
had come true.
In 1912 at H avre’s annual fair Hill explained
his vision.
He told those startled citizens that the time
had come for the settlement of a farm family on every 160
or 320 acre plot within the millions of acres of M o n t a n a ’s
public domain.
Howard maintained that H i l l ’s vision was so
successful that all Montanans (the farmers and stockmen in
the northern portion of the state in particular) were help
lessly dependent on the railroad.

8
to eastern Montana,
place

$50) and in it he was permitted to

fa"ll second hand articles such as household goods,

machinery, agr:i cultural implements, vehicles, wagons, tools,
etc.’

Small livestock (sheep and hogs) not exceeding 20

head and lar^e stock (cattle, horses, and mules) not over
10 head were also permitted.”8

In some instances the trip

to Montana was a bit crowded.
Local and state organizations also participated in
attracting homesteaders to Montana.

They extolled the

abundant rainfall of the region and conveniently failed to
mention the sub-zero temperatures and cold winds that were
common to Montana winters.

Neither did these groups explain

about the recurring droughts or the condition of the soil
when the land became parched due to the lack of rain.

One

such alluring description of M o n t a n a ’s excellent climate
appeared in a pamphlet distributed in 1904 by the Montana
W o r l d ’s Fair Commission in St. Louis:
Because of the dryness of the atmosphere even
the ocfcasional extreme cold is not severely felt,
nor is the warm weather of the summer at all dis
agreeable.
In fact in the summer months Montana
is one great pleasure and health resort, while
its Indian summers, extending generally well
towards the Christmas holidays, are incomparable.9
" ' —

• 1

8I b i d .,

'

T"

181

^Montana W o r l d ’s Fair Commission, ’’Montana the Treasure
State,” e d . by John W. Read (St. Louis:
Con P. Curran Print
ing Co., 1904 ),
7. The state issued this pamphlet under
the direction of M o n t a n a ’s W o r l d ’s Fair Commission for free
distribution at S t . Louis during the Louisiana Purchase
Exposition of 1904.

9
Another leaflet, released i n •1908 about the city of
Great Falls, claimed that its population was increasing
more rapidly than at any time in its history.

City fathers

believed that the community would reach a population of fif
ty thousand in five y e a r s .-*-15

The city, in fact, did not

attain that population until fifty years later.
The Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909 also encouraged
settlers to migrate.westward.

This act doubled the acreage

allotment from 160 to 320 acres.

In 1912 the "Three-year

Homestead Law" cut the proving-up time from five to three
years.

In addition the owner could be absent five months

each year from the claim.
One group that attested to the success of this adver
tising barrage and the passage of the Homestead Acts was
the speculators.

At every train stop there was a land

office, and a "land locator," as they liked to be called,
met each newly arriving train.

Rushed to the land office,

the locator quickly persuaded the honyocker to file on his
new c l a i m . " T h e n

a wagon or backboard,

loaded with pro-

■^Great Falls Chamber of Commerce, "Great Falls and
the Midland Empire"
(Great Falls: W. T. Ridgley Calendar
Co., 1908),
5»
The population of Great Falls was .13 .943
in 1910; 24.121 in 1920; 2 8 .822 in 1930; 29.928 in 1940;
39 o214 in 1950; and 5 5.357 in I960.
Population statistics
were from the U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Eighteenth Census of the United States. I960:
Population, I,
10.
^^The homesteader paid a $22 filing fee for a 320 acre
claim, $16 for a 160 acre plot, and $5 for an 80 acre claim.
Montana Bureau of Agriculture, Labor and Industry, The Resources and Opportunities of Montana (Helena:
State Publishing~*Co
"T9T9Tj
2TI
Hereafter cited as Montana*s Resources.

:io
visions, barrels of water and a plow, would pull up out
side.

A homeseeker was urged to pay the fee ^ u suaH y

$25 to $50/ and get

from

’expert’ assistance in locating the

best land.”
It was not unusual for a speculator to locate five
or six claims in a day.

They made a good living in this

way and most of them were quite honest.

However,

some of

these men only wanted to get rich, and at the honyocker’s
expense.

These unscrupulous speculators quite often lo

cated more than one homesteader on the same claim.
Once located the newcomer quickly plowed the ground
for cultivation and chose a suitable site for his new home.
Some of the dwellings that the honybcker’s built resembled
the sod houses on the Kansas and Nebraska plains.

However,

most of the homes were 10 x 12 shacks with tar roofs and
no foundation.

In the winter time dirt and snow had to be

piled up outside along the sides to prevent the cold from
coming under the walls.

Even old rags stuffed into cracks

could not stop the cold air from piercing the dwelling and
nothing could prevent the window frames from warping.
The wind was the worst enemy.

It shook the small

shacks with fury and the earthen floors became extremely
cold.

The stove, usually located in one corner of the

12

Mabel Lux, "Honyockers of Harlem, Scissorbills of
Zurich.” Montana Magazine of History, September, 1963,
6.

11

house, provided the only heat.

Since wood was so scarce

the homesteaders utilized cow dung and hay which gave off
a rancid odor.

Continual attention had to be given to

keeping the fire going.
The problem of water w^s a major one, for only a few
homes had ideal locations close to streams.
water was hauled by barrel.

Most of the

This was often a half day

or an all day task depending on how far the water had to
be carried.

Those that were fortunate enough to afford it

hired someone to dig a well.
he dug his own.

When one could not afford it

"This was not so bad in low-lands, but

often enough he had to go down two or three hundred feet
with a pick and shovel while his wife hauled up the dirt
with a w i n d l a s s .
In the winter many farmers left their wives and children
to find jobs in neighboring towns.

These courageous women

had to rely on themselves and it toughened their spirits.
The howling wind, the cold, the close quarters of the
small shacks, and the loneliness were only a few of the
problems with which they had to contend.

Many did not

survive and those that did persuaded their husbands to
give up everything on their new homesteads to return east.

"^Toole, Montana:
An Uncommon
was a common method of well digging
steaders.
The process was slow and
proved unfavorable, but water was a

Land. 231-2.
This
for the poorer home
quite often the results
necessity and every
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From 19X0 to 1918 Montana's farmers prospered.

The

need for wheat during World War I pushed the price of wheat
to $2 a bushel.

The price of land doubled and Montanans

could see no end to the rising price of grain.

The home

steaders borrowed money to buy more land and better equip
ment.

Bankers loaned money freely because land was used as

collateral.

There was speculation that wheat might jump

to $4 a bushel before 1920.

Why shouldnft the banker help

the farmer and also reap some of these benefits?
borrowed from eastern capital at 6 percent.

The banks

They loaned

to the honyockers at 10 percent and secured a good profit.
In the years. 1915 to 1920 the national income doubled.
No where was this more pronounced than in agriculture.
According to the Agricultural Department the farm income in
1919 had reached a level that was double that of the five
years preceding the war.

This increase in farm income was

due to the 100 percent increase in the prices farmers re
ceived for their p r o d u c e . ^

Steadily rising prices for

farm land and increased farm loans also reflected the post
war speculation of rising grain prices.

means possible was exhausted to obtain this precious com
modity.
But, a hole dug by hand three hundred feet into
the soil is practically impossible, if not absurd, and Dr.
Toole has committed a grave error of over-exaggeration on
this point.
For a good description of early Montana well
digging see, nThe Last of the Homesteaders," by John Talbot
Graham in The Montana Magazine of History, April 1968,
62-75*
^ P a u l W. McCracken, The Northwest in Two Wars (Minn
eapolis:
The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, n.d.),
2.
Hereafter cited as McCracken, The Northwest in Two W a r s .

!3
The global recession began in the summer of 1920 and
prices dropped drastically.

Grain prices declined 66 per

cent in the ensuing 15 months and meat prices fell 60 per1c
cent. J The recession affected not only whole communities
but the entire country.
Still another calamity dispelled the small hopes held
by the Great Plains farmers.

"When the drought came, it

did not come all at once or in all places at the same time.
Drought is a little like cancer; it seems to spread outward
until it encompasses everything.
when the rains ceased to fall.
the payments on their equipment.
in paying their feed bills.

'Everyone was hit hard

The farmers could not meet
Cattlemen had difficulty

Local merchants had to extend

credit to these people or file for bankruptcy themselves.
Affected by all these groups were the banks.

They continued

to lend money while looking at the sky in desperation wait
ing for the rain to come.
No one could understand it.

From the turn of the

twentieth century to 1916, Montana yielded an average of
25 bushels of wheat to the acre.

By 1919, the third year

of the drought, the average was only 2.4 b ushels. ^

In

July of that year Governor S. V. Stewart called a special

^ ^Ibid .,

6.

1^T°°le, Montana;
17 Howard, Montana;

An Uncommon L a n d .
High. Wide,

235.

and Handsome.

197*

I4

session of the Montana legislature to consider the agri
cultural emergency.
Despite these meager crop yields the worst was yet to
come.

The topsoil blew away.

The far m e r ’s plow had cut

so deeply into the soil (sometimes up to a foot) it-took only
a slight wind to carry it away.

Prairie fires, quite com

mon during these dry spells, roared across the dry land with
abandon.

Wells even dried up.

If the farmer somehow managed to survive all this and
cultivated even a small crop he could look forward to still
another disaster— the grasshoppers.

When these black

clouds of insects swept across the land there was very
little left in their wake.

They even devoured the stubble

leaving nothing to hold the soil.
From 1921-1925 one half of all the farmers lost their
land through bankruptcy and foreclosure.

From 1926-1929

there were ten thousand more farm foreclosures.

Non-resi-r

dent foreclosures made up approximately one-fourth of this
total.

18

This cut land value in half.

The farmers that

did remain through these years continued to borrow to
plant more seeds and buy better equipment to insure larger
yields.
This vicious cycle of borrowing and living on credit
ended with the collapse of over half of M o n t a n a ’s banks

l8Ibid.,

207-8 .

by 1926.

IQ

Thousands of the state’s farmers and their

families left in disappointment.
choked with despair.

These people had been

They remembered the good times of

Montana's boom era— its rain and its prosperity.

Most

vivid in their minds, though, were the hard times.

Many

Montanans had little sympathy for the homesteader.

They

were skeptical of his way of living.

When he could not

conquer nature and all of its unpredictable elements they
felt he had brought it on himself.
No matter what his treatment, by man or by nature,
the honyocker secured for himself a place in M o n t a n a ’s
history.

For those farmers that remained the wet and

dry cycles continued through the thirties and forties.
The value of land also fluctuated accordingly.

These

diehards had survived harder times and would not quit.
The homesteaders that did not survive the bitter years of
the twenties had little to show for it.

Many of them

came to Montana with only a small savings.

They left

with nothing, except the memory of their struggle against
impossible odds and their dreams of prosperity they brought
with them.

"^In 1920 Montana had 396 state and national commer
cial banks in operation. Within six years 214 of those
banks closed their doors either by suspending their opera
tion, voluntarily liquidating, or placing the banks in the
hands of receivers.
These figures were compiled from the
records of bank statements in the Annual Report of the
Banking Department, State of Montana for the fiscal years
ending, Nov. 30, 1920, and June 30, 1926, and the Abstract
of Reports of the Condition of M ontana State Banks. Trust
Companies. Private and National B a n k s . Nov. 15, 1920,
and June 30, 1926.

16

II

The rapid settlement of Montana from 1910 to 1920
created an uncontrolled hysteria in the expansion of the
stateTs banking facilities.

M o n t a n a ’s population increased

from 376*000 to 549*000 during this period— an addition
of 173*000 inhabitants.

Rain was plentiful and the First

World War doubled the price of wheat.

The honyockers*

encouraged by private and public organizations* bought
more land and machinery.

It became the f a r m e r ’s patriotic

duty to raise food for the war.

Consequently, the number

of farms in the state doubled and land value soared from
$250*000,000 in 1910 to the 1920 total of $700,000,000 .20
To accommodate this new found wealth the chartering
of 397 banks occurred from 1910 to 1919* three-fourths of
which were state banks.

In 1919 alone, the state chartered

an incredibly high number of 82 banks* both state and federal.

21

’’The number of banks in the United States reached

its highest point in 1921 with more than 30,500.
3*8 25 were in the Ninth Federal Reserve District

Of these,
(Montana,

20

John H. Toole, "Montana Agriculture and the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis* 1917 to .1925n (unpublished
paper, Archives, University of Montana* n.d.)*
4»
Hereafter
cited as Toole, "Montana Agriculture, 1917-1925
21

Clarence Groth, "Sowing and Reaping:
Montana Banking,
1910-1925* "Montana Magazine of History, October 1970,
30.
Hereafter.cited as Groth* "Montana Banking, 1910-1925.
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North Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota).

This is almost

three times the present number t oday.1,22
To say that Montana was heavily overbanked at that
time is an understatement.

Obtaining a bank charter in

the state was not a difficult task.

There was a minimum

capital requirement of $20,000 for a state bank in 1 9 1 0 .
This money could be placed in the b a n k Ts own treasury.
The law, amended in 1915, tightened controls and made it
a requirement that the $20,000. be deposited in a different
bank.
The requirements for bank charters were not strict
and any small community could obtain a bank.
of Agawam,

'

The town

for example, which had only 50 people, procured

a charter in November, 1912, in hopes of being on a rail
road line.

The charter was never activated because the

line terminated at that p o i n t .24
Some towns, little more than drinking holes, had a
bank in the community.
included Toston, Vanada,

22

A few of these little known towns
Lothair, Savoy, Kolin, Coburg

*

Dick Heiber and Clement Van Nice, (paper presented
before the joint meeting of the Board of Directors of the
Minneapolis and Helena office of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis on Oct. 15, 1966, Archives, University of
M o n t a n a ) . Hereafter cited as Heiber and Van Nice, paper
presented before Federal Reserve Bank members, Oct. 15,
1966.
2^Groth,
24Ibii.

"Montana Banking, 1910-1925,"

30.
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and Madoc.

All of the banks in these locations acquired

charters after 1913 and were either liquidated or placed
into receivership by 1 9 2 5 *
The town of Medicine Lake (population 300) had three
banks in 1923, two chartered in 1911 and one in 1912.

Two

of them failed in 1923, less than a month apart, and the
third no longer exists.

"To serve a total population of

about 37,500 in Fergus, Hill, Sheridan and Valley counties
in 1920, there were 8 5 banks (about one for each 440 persons— against a 1920 national average of one to 3 ,5 00).”

25

Only eight banks survived.
One reason for so many small towns was the emotional
fever over county splitting.

County splitting groups

quickly organized when the population surged.

These new

counties meant more towns, additional businesses, and in
creased employment.

It also meant more public officials,

construction of county buildings,

and a larger state and

county budget to run these agencies.
had to be levied.

For this, new taxes

This growth was fine until the honyockers

experienced the drought and its hardships.

For those that

remained, taxes rose— as high as 140 percent an acre in
some c o u n t i e s . R e a d y

cash was no longer available and

living on credit became a stark reality.

25I b i d .
2^K. Ross Toole, "Montana:
A Twentieth Century Por
trait” (unpublished manuscript, Archives, University of
Montana, 1971),
61.
Hereafter cited as Toole, "Montana:
A Twentieth Century Portrait.”
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The ease with which small town banks could obtain a
charter, particularly the state banks, presupposes that
there were never tight controls placed on the chartering
of banks.

Montana did have banking regulations at that

time but statewide supervision proved very weak.

Any pe r 

son or group of bank promoters had only to put up the
necessary collateral to purchase a charter.

No experience

in banking was required for the b a n k ’s officers or dir
ectors .
Since there were few experienced bankers in the state,
local businessmen and farmers answered the call to fill
the needed positions.

Worse, bankers who were brought to

Montana to manage these banks knew little of the state’s
dependence on a narrow agricultural economy.

Although

these men knew the ins and outs of banking they knew nothing
about wheat farming and its unpredictable elements.
Before the drought came in 19-17, hopes of making quick
profits encouraged the extension of many loans.

Bankers

charged the farmer from 10 to 12 percent interest and rare
ly checked his collateral.

There is the story of a Montana

farmer who had borrowed $10,000 from a banker in Choteau
county.

A neighbor commented that he did not think he

could sleep at night if it were he who had taken such a
high loan.

"Why should I be troubled,” the borrower ex

claimed } ’’the banker should be the one to worry, its his
m o n e y .” 2 7

^ P e r s o n a l interview with Harold M. Brown, Choteau
county homesteader and school teacher, Great Falls, Montana,
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Not only were local bankers careless about making
their loans, but this incident illustrated the irrespon
sibility of many borrowers.

The average Montana farmer

paid on his loan only after he had sold his crop, figured
his living expenses for the coining year, and bought addi
tional farm equipment— oftentimes a new car.

"Usually

the loan was renewed, and frequently the accrued interest
was added to _/his;7 debt; in fact, by that time most bankers
had been carrying the loans so long that they had to try
to keep their borrowers solvent or go down with them."

28

The total deposits for all of M o n t a n a ’s banks in
1921 was only $2,000,000 more than their total assets.
The ratio of loans to deposits was an incredibly high 98.6
2Q
p e r c e n t .'67

*
In many banks it was not unusual to find loans

exceeding deposits,

some by outrageously high amounts.

In

1922 the First State Bank of Buffalo had $71,000 in deposits
and $145,000 in loans; the Virgelle State Bank,

$24*000 in

deposits and $41,000 in loans; and the Citizens State Bank
of Clyde Park,

$55,000 in deposits and $199,000 in loans.

December 20, 1970.
M . Brown.

Hereafter cited as interview, Harold

^Groth,

1910-1925,”
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"Montana Banking,

32.

Heiber and Van Nice, paper presented before Federal
Reserve Bank members, Oct. 15, 1966.

The latter had a loan to deposit ratio of 360 percent.3^
The bank failed a year later in 1923*
"National banks were at a competitive disadvantage
with state banks until /the passage of/ the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913* but thereafter they entered the field with an
aggressiveness unbecoming their self-asserted conservatism."

31
.

Reductions on reserve requirements and privileges

of extending real estate loans opened the profitable savings
business to national banks.

Loans could be extended on

improved farm land, providing they did not exceed one-half
of the properties market

v a l u e .

32

There was a maximum

limit of five years on these loans.
Competition between state and national banks became
very pronounced, not only for obtaining depositors, but
for loaning money.

Unfortunately, though, the bankers

proved to be better lenders than promotion experts in
attracting depositors.

This is borne out by the fact that

the Helena Branch of the Ninth Federal Reserve District in
February, 1921,

(the day it opened) secured $4 ,775*000 in

deposits from its member banks and $7 *665*000 in loans.

31
32

Toole,

"Montana:

A Twentieth Century Portrait,"

Donald Jerome Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures
in Montana* 1920-1926" (unpublished MA thesis, Archives*
University of Montana, 1967)*
14.
Hereafter cited as
Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures, 1920-1926."

54*
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In only six months loans climbed to $13y601,Q00--three
times the amount of its member bank d e p o s i t s . ^
To compound matters these small banks became caught
in the same dilemma which faced many of the n a t i o n ’s
other rural banks— the inability to diversify their loans.
Dependent on one-crop industries, the country banks limit
ed their sphere of operation.

By not spreading their

loans beyond the reach of a single local economy they
could never hope to hold their own in a time of adversity.
In times of prosperity in these sections, banks were
prosperous, in times of adversity banks f a i l e d . ^
America’s banking systems in agricultural regions
had never been sound in the past, due to their dependence
on one-crop communities in which they were located.

This

proved to be the common denominator for the majority of
the banks in Montana.

In addition to one-crop dependence,

Montana banks had several other ’’...distinct characteristics
in common:

more state banks failed than national; more

small banks failed than large; more country banks failed
than city banks; more new banks failed than old; and more
failed east of the Continental Divide than west.1' ^

33

Heiber and Van Nice, paper presented before Federal
Reserve Bank members, Oct. 15, 1966.
^ C h a r l e s Wallace Collins. Rural Banking Reform (New
York:
The MacMillan Co., 1931),
67-8.
Hereafter cited
as Collins, Rural Banking Reform.
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Toole, ’’Montana:

A Twentieth Century Portrait,”
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The summer of 1917 brought 1 .ittie moisture.
year of drought ushered .in the
and 1920.

This first

lean years ol‘ 19.1 8 , 1919

The summers were long and the parched lands of

eastern Montana furnished no pasture for the vast sheep
and cattle herds.

Wheat harvests dwindled and the ground

lay scorched in the glaring sunlight.

Deflation ensued

in 1919 and cattle that were worth $100 the fall before
were sold from $25 to $50 a head.3^

Wheat was $3*30 a

bushel that year and sold for $.92 in 1922.

17

The surge in European agriculture during this time
drove the price of wheat even lower in some states.

In

1921 the United States exported $551*000,000 of wheat,
by 1929 only $192,000,000,

a decline of 65 percent.3^

No

longer could the western wheat farmer look to foreign
markets to sustain his prosperity.

Newspapers in report

ing agricultural prices in July 1919 announced a seemingly
unrelated fact that living costs had risen in the United
States by 88 percent since 1913---further burdens awaited
39
Montana Ts honyockers.

■^^Superintendent of Banks, Annual Report of the
Banking Department. State of Montana for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1924 (Helena, Mont.:
Independent Publish
ing Co., 1924).
Hereafter cited as Annual Bank Report
(with given year).
3^Toole* "Montana Agriculture, 1917-1925,”
^McCracken,
3^Toole,

The Northwest in Two W a r s ,

4»

12-3•

"Montana Agriculture, 1917-1925*”

5.
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III

The sudden closing of a b a n k ’s doors is a shock to
the whole community,

L, Q. Skelton, the state Superintend

ent of Banks, in 1924* in his annual report for the end of
that fiscal year vividly described the effect of a b a n k ’s
termination:
The ruin, the distress, the litigation, bankruptcies,
the wrath of the depositors, a suicide or two, homes
broken up, fortunes lost, l abor’s savings swept away,
the w i d o w ’s mite gone, business stagnated, confidence
shaken, men of reputation sent to prison perhaps,
and all that follows the order to close the doors of
a bank, are circumstances of the first magnitude,
and hence no thoughtful Superintendent can but feel
the importance and responsibility of his office and
the dreadful consequences of a false step.4^
Local depositors were the worst hurt.

Money was diffi

cult to accumulate in rural communities, especially through
years of self-denial and careful planning for o n e ’s final
days of leisure. . Banking policies were not easily under
stood,

The sudden closing of a b a n k ’s doors and its place

ment in the hands of an unfamiliar adjustor caused a loss
of confidence.
ruptcy and ruin.

To small merchants it often meant bank
To individual depositors it brought d e 

spair and bewilderment— Montana was a paradigm of all this
in the 1 9 2 0 ’s.

^°Annual Bank Report, June 30, 1924*
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Equally affected were those who borrowed from the bank.
To meet the demands of the depositors every asset was li
quidated, the majority of which consisted of the notes of
the borrowers.

The immediate closing of a bank for receiver

ship purposes or for liquidation necessitated the collec
tion of all outstanding notes, usually held by local m e r 
chants and farmers.

From 1919 to 1929 the bankruptcy

rate of Montana's farms was the highest in the nation.
Farm mortgage indebtedness reached an unbelievably high
figure of $1 7 5 ,000,000.41
The stockholders of community banks bought shares
for the purpose o f ■investment— usually these shareholders
were local farmers and businessmen.

When a bank failed

these stockholders were responsible for any loss to the
depositors.

Many Montana farmers and merchants who were

fortunate to survive the disaster of the falling wheat
market found themselves ruined because they owned stock
in local banks.
Another class that assumed responsibility for bank
failures was the directors.

Boards of directors of banks

possessed a personal liability for the actual operations
of the bank.

Although operated by a president and his

staff, the bank*s directors were liable for any negligence
of mismanagement.
and cashiers,

Bank presidents, their vice presidents

after a bank*s failure, were generally

44Howard, Montana:

High..Wide, and Handsome,

208.

the targets ef an impaired reputation since they had not
only a financial responsibility, but a mqral obligation to
t he community.
One incident, for example, that questioned the integ
rity of one of these local bankers occurred in 1924, in a
Fort Benton bank.

A middle-aged widow with six children

inquired if it would be safe to deposit her $300 savings
in the bank.

The banker replied, pointing out the window

at the Missouri River, ”Lady, when the water in that river
starts to flow in the opposite direction, then you can be
gin to worry about the safety of your money in this bank.n^^
Two weeks after she deposited her money the bank failed,
no doubt little surprise to the banker who knew the finan
cial condition of his own bank prior to its failing.
M o n t a n a ’s bank failures produced an epidemic loss of
faith and launched a run op the state’s commercial banks.
Farmers openly voiced their disenchantment and local poli
ticians and newspapers took up the cry.

Someone was to

blame and the role of scapegoat fell to the Federal Reserve
Sy s t e m .

42 Interview, Harold M. Brown.
Joseph Kinsey Howard
took the opposite stance in supporting his attack oh the
Federal Reserve System as the major reason for M o n t a n a ’s
bank failures.
He maintained that dishonesty did not
break one of the banks which closed in Montana during the
1 9 2 0 ’s, Several bankers and employees did go to jail,
he contended, but in nearly every instance the offense
was falsification of the books in a desperate attempt to
keep their banks alive, and with no effort to profit per
sonally.
Howard, Montanai
High, Wide, and Handsome. .233*
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Joseph Kinsey Howard sujnmed up the feeling of many
Montanans in regard to that agency.

He insisted that

"...the Federal Reserve Board deliberately smashed prices
while relentlessly squeezing agricultural paper out of
rural banks leaving them with inadequate economic resources
for the community."

Further, "...unnecessary deflation

policies removed money from Montana and placed it in
Federal Reserve vaults while the life flowed out of the
state."

The final straw occurred when the Liberty Bonds,,

which were the last assets of the rural bankers and their
customers, reached discounts of $.80 on the dollar.

The

end result for M o n t a n a ’s farmers was "...distress selling
of wheat and livestock to meet overdue notes.
This opinion has been widely accepted throughout the
state, no doubt due to the popularity of Howard’s book.
Someone must accept the responsibility for the state’s
"banking disaster" in the 1920’s and Montanans willingly
approved the b o o k ’s convincing arguments.

"It was easier

to deal with a conspiracy by men than the cycles of nature
and complex world economic conditions«"44
H o w a r d ’s theories, however, are now being questioned
by Federal Reserve officials and western historians.

Since

the Federal Reserve System began in 1913 ib seems improbable

^ H o w a r d , Montana:
High, Wide, and Handsome.
chapter twenty, "The Role of the Federal Reserve."
44

Toole, "Montana:

See

A Twentieth Century Portrait,"

57.
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that it was experienced enough to prevent the downfall of
the western economy.

The Board had no control over the

drop in wheat prices and the resulting loss of faith.

Nor,

did the agency have the ability to control the balances
of member banks to any important d e g r e e .

Even had it

possessed such power, it would not follow that the Board
was responsible for either the magnitude of member bank
balances or the use to which they were p u t . ^
The Ninth Federal District and the Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis were no exception.

The Federal Reserve

had only limited authority over Ninth District banks.

This

is demonstrated by the fact that seventy percent of M o n t a n a ’s
banks failed in the years 1921-1929.

The same percentage

failed in South Dakota, while North Dakota lost sixtytwo percent and Minnesota thirty-one p e r c e n t , ^

This was

the highest rate of bank failures of any district in the
nation.

The national average was only twenty percent,

lending suspicion to local bank practices in the Ninth
District.
When questioning the policy of the Ninth District,
the Minneapolis Bank did all it could to prevent the run
on its member banks— particularly those in Montana.

In

45

S. E. H a m s , Twenty Years of Federal Reserve Policy
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1 9 3 3)>
22 8 .
4U

Excerpt from 1953 Annual R e p o r t . Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, Archives, University of Montana.
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addition to the $13*601,000 the Minneapolis Bank loaned to
Montana banks,

"...so much credit was extended that th<s

b a n k ’s gold reserves would have fallen below the legal
minimum if it had not borrowed from other Federal Reserve
b a n k s . I n

1920 approximately 89 percent of all the out

standing loans of the Minneapolis Bank (nearly $90,000,000)
were extensions to agricultural and livestock interests in
the Ninth Federal Reserve District.
Joseph Kinsey Howard was correct, though, when he said
the Federal Reserve forced hardships on many western farm
ers.

The board tightened credit too hard and too fast to

curb ’’inflationary borrowing.’’

It was also to blame for en

couraging increased post-war wheat production and for being
unsympathetic toward the mass exodus of ruined honyockers.
’’Increased wheat planting held serious consequences for
farmers who incurred large mortgage obligations on the
basis of high war prices.

They soon realized the mistake

of carrying this indebtedness and making payments when
prices dropped.”49
But, it cannot be held responsible for indiscriminate
chartering and inflated farm values.

The chartering of

state banks was not the responsibility of the Federal Reserve

47Ibid.
“^ F e d e r a l Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, The Federal
Reserve Bank and the Farmer Stockman (Minneapolis:
Federal
Reserve Bank, April 2, 192l), 9.
Copy in the Archives,
University of Montana.
York:

. A. Goldenweiser, American Monetary Policy (New
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951),
137.
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System.

They were chartered by the state of Montana and

the Comptroller of the C u r r e n c y . ^

Neither could the

Federal Reserve accept responsibility when the banks b e 
came over-extended.

Easy credit policies were not the

answer, for further loans only encouraged banks to make
further extensions of credit.
’’The great number of failures of small country banks
had no direct relationship to the Federal Reserve System.”'*'*'
The same case can be made for the Ninth Federal Reserve
District.

The causes for these banking failures must be

found elsewhere.
No one major cause can be attributed to the high m o r 
tality of Montana banks and the failures of its farmers.
Rather it was a combination of many reasons that weighed
so heavily on M o n t a n a ’s economy that a collapse was in
evitable .
Drought, poor crops,

inexperienced homesteaders,

in

flated land values, county splitting, declining wheat and
beef prices,

and the loss of European markets all placed

a strain on M o n t a n a fs banks.
management,

Promiscuous chartering, mis

inexperience in banking, lack of diversification

of loans, over-extension of credit, and unwise Federal
Reserve policies compounded these matters.

The end result

was a loss of confidence for the local farmers, culminated
by a run on the s t a t e ’s unstable banks and a mass exodus

CQ

Letter, Clement Van Nice to John H. Toole, D e c 0 8 ,
1966 Archives, University of Montana.
51Collins, Rural Banking Refo r m .

42.
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of M o n t a n a ’s homesteaders.

CHAPTER II
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
FACTORS OF THE BANK

I
On February 15, 1910, the Gilman State Bank offi
cially became an incorporated bank in Montana.

Origin

ally known as the Augusta State Bank, it began operation
in Augusta, Montana,

53 miles west of Great Falls and

25 miles south of Choteau at the foot of the Rocky
Mountains..

The idea of starting the bank originated in

Cando, North Dakota;

six men signed the articles of in

corporation .
Augusta at that time was badly in need of a bank b e 
cause merchandise had to be brought by freight team and
mail had to be transported overland by stage.-*-

A bank

in this region, these men reasoned, would serve a useful
purpose.

If managed properly, Augusta had the capacity

to support a local bank.
The principal coordinator, and only president of the
bank, was Abraham Lincoln Bradley.

Born of English parents

and reared in Ontario, Canada, Bradley began his career
at the age of seventeen.

After graduating from high school

in 1882, in Bowmanville, Ontario, he assumed the position

Tape recording, Homer J. Wellman to the author
April 15, 1971*
Hereafter cited as tape, Homer J. Wellman.
3.2
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of messenger boy in the Merchants Bank of St. Thomas,
Ontario.

He remained in that capacity for two and one-

half years until he started a homestead near Langdon,
North Dakota.
Bradley's homesteading days lasted ten years, until
1894, when he accepted the post as bookkeeper in a Langdon
implement firm.

In 1900, after a six year stint in Langdon,

he moved to Cando and worked as a bookkeeper for another
implement company, Currie and Riggs.

He stayed there un

til 1910, when he assumed the presidency of the Augusta
State B a n k .2
Another charter member of the bank was R. Percy
Abbey.

A native of Grand Forks, North Dakota, he gradu

ated in 1904 from the University of North Dakota.

He

studied law for a year and eventually obtained employment
in Cando as chief clerk and cashier for a local realty
company.^

He also handled duties as bookkeeper and ab

stractor, and managed many of the firm's farm loans.

It

was in Cando that Abbey and Bradley met and formed their
lasting friendship.

From the bank's origin to January,

1917, Percy Abbey served as cashier.

O

Letter, R. Percy Abbey to the Bradstreet Company,
May 10, 1910, Gilman State Bank papers, Archives, Univer
sity of Montana.
Hereafter cited as Gilman papers.
^Letter, Abbey to Thomas H. Carter, Oct. 31* 1910,
Gilman papers.
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Other men instrumental in the b a n k ’s formation and
signers of the articles of incorporation included:

Harry

Lord, cousin to Abbey and cashier of the First State Bank
of Candoj J. S. Conyers, a local Cando rancher; J. C. Furman,
Augusta resident and hotel owner; and M. A. Wellman, owner
and operator of an Augusta mercantile firm.
These men bought 200 of the original 2 50 shares in
the bank.

Each share sold for $100.^

This left only

$5,000 to sell to meet the original $25,000 goal for the
b a n k ’s capital stock.

Augusta area residents bought some

of the shares and the remainder went to interested par
ties in North Dakota, Iowa, Minnesota and Illinois.
The Augusta State Bank began its operation in the
center of the Sun River Valley.

The bank did a respectable

business in Augusta and speculation ensued over building a

4

table

i

SHARES OF STOCK CONTROLLED
BY THE ORIGINAL DIRECTORS
OF THE AUGUSTA STATE BANK
Name
Harry Lord
J. S. Conyers
A. L. Bradley
R. Percy Abbey
J. C. Furman
M. A. Wellman

Shares

Amount

50
50
40
40
10
10

$5,000
$5,000
$4,000
$ 4,000
$1,000
$1,000

The Articles of Incorporation, Feb. 15, 1910, Gil
man papers.
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permanent structure,
ters.

as the bank had only temporary quar

At that time Augusta had a population of 400,

served by a variety of stores.
The local paper, in a short historical sketch about
the community that appeared weekly, described the assets
and opportunities abounding in Augusta.

In addition to

its four churches and excellent school, the article stated
that the community maintained ’’...three general stores,
three saloons, two good hotels, two barber shops, a pool
and billiard hall, ad opera house, a moving picture show,
a clothes cleaning shop and a first class creamery.
The small town also had the usual lumber yard, drug store,
livery stable, blacksmith shop, garage, implement dealer
and real estate company.
The Great Northern received a great deal of freight
out of the Augusta area in the way of cattle,
wool.

sheep,' and

Ranchers shipped few farm products as most of it

was used on the ranches.

Other railroads,

such as the

Milwaukee, got this freight after it reached Great Falls,
so the Great Northern board of directors was anxious to
f\
tap this area with a spur l i n e .
The railroad undertook a survey to determine the
main line through the Sun River Canyon.

The railroad an

nounced that it intended to continue the line through the
canyon,

’’...over the continental divide and down the Middle

^Appeareb weekly in the Augusta T i m e s .
^Tape, Homer J, Wellman.

36
Fork of the Flathead River to join with the main track
in the vicinity of Nimrod on the southern boundary of
Glacier

Park.”?

When the railroad completed the survey,

Augusta was off the planned route; one reason being that
the area had poor drainage.
At a point two miles northeast of Augusta on the
proposed route the railroad bought approximately 160
acres of land from a longtime area rancher, E. D. Boone.
Here it established a new town, Gilman— named after one
of the Great Northern officials.

The Gilman Townsite

Company formed as a corporation and "...was known as be
ing owned by the Great Northern.

Bradley, however, was

one that was very active with the front men in selling
l o t s .”8
Bradley and several other Augusta residents saw the
opportunity of moving to this new location.

They had the

idea they could move most of the businesses to Gilman.
By moving general stores, hotels, livery stables and
saloons, Bradley and the others felt that a ghost town
Q
would be left b e h i n d .7
In March 1912, Percy Abbey wrote a friend that,
"...we are selling lots in the town of Gilman and have

^Great Falls Tribune. Jan. 7* 1938•
8

Tape, Homer J. Wellman.

9Ibid .

sold quite a number.

Augusta people have taken lots

_/and there are7 in the neighborhood of 70 lots gone al
ready.

Five months later in correspondence with a

stockholder, Abbey wrote:

"The townsite company has of

fered us two lots, free on the best corner in town if we
will erect a brick or stone building."
hope in the m o v e :

He further expressed

"I think we can greatly increase our

business when we have a building that looks like a bank.
It will more than make interest on the investment and we
are getting a valuable corner thrown in." 11
Most of M o n t a n a ’s banks at that time had buildings
of either brick or stone.

The bank in Gilman,

of red brick, was no exception.

constructed

This construction not

only limited the chance of fire and burglary, but denoted
strength and stability in the institution.

Depositors

felt more secure with their money in an imposing structure,
not to mention the prosperity it represented in the com
munity .
The townsite also gave lots to prospective residents
and businessmen to entice them to abandon their ties with
Augusta and re-establish themselves in Gilman.

"The old

guard in Augusta was quite a stubborn group and they were
l

Letter, Abbey to Orie T. Brown, March 2, 1912,
Gilman papers.
■^Letter, Abbey to F. W. Ramaley, Aug. 27, 1912,
Gilman papers.
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not in agreement with Bradley moving the b a nk.”'1"2
One of these men was J. C. Furman, an original stock
holder in the firm,

On September 12, 1912, the bank

called a special stockholder's meeting to discuss removal
to Gilman.

Bradley, who controlled 90 votes

(50 of his

own and 40 by proxy), voted in favor of moving the bank
and changing the name to the Gilman State Bank.

Percy

Abbey, with 80 shajres (40 by proxy), also favored the
motion.

J. C. Furman, who had 10 individual shares and

controlled the pro^y on 40 more, opposed the move.

After

the motion passed, the directors decided to keep pace
with the foreseen prosperity by voting to increase the
1o
number of directors from five to eight.
Furman immediately resigned as one of the b a n k ’s
directors before it relocated in Gilman,
as a director for a new bank in Augusta.

later to serve
Other residents

in the area also chose sides and two camps developed -—
those supporting the established city of Augusta, and
those who backed Bradley and the formation of Gilman.
Disenchanted with the move the b a n k ’s vice president,
A. W. Beach,

"...offered his stock for sale and withdrew

active support of the institution" as reported in the

'*'2Tape, Homer J. Wellman.
11
JMinutes of the stockholder’s meeting, Sept, 12,
1912, Gilman papers.
Hereafter cited as minutes (with
given y e a r ) .
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minutes.

The stockholders elected E. D. Boone to fill

the new vacancy.^4
An intense rivalry developed between the two commu
nities to take the other off the map.

Gilman's residents

based their hopes on the populace moving from Augusta to
their town; Augusta's citizens relied on the belief that
the railroad would be extended the additional two miles
to their city.

The Great Falls Tribune, some years later

in describing the rivalry,

commented:

"Not only were the

townspeople arrayed against each other, but families were
split by divided l o y a l t i e s . " ^
Habitual conflict over the railroad, coupled with
the removal of the bank to Gilman, pushed ill-feeling to
feverish heights.

This, added to Bradley's attempts to

garner support from Augusta firms, precipitated a move
in Augusta that dealt heavily on the Gilman State Bank.
Bradley had alienated so many Augusta residents that a
group organized to start another bank--this one in Au
gusta.

The action immediately cut in half the bank's

potential monetary resources in the area.

The new bank,

the Peoples Bank of Augusta, received its charter on
December 22, 1912.

This occurred less than one month

after the Gilman bank had relocated.

■^Minutes, Nov. 12, 1912, Gilman papers.
~^Great Falls Tribune. Jan. 7 f 1938*
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The rivalry reached such a high point that by the
fall of 19l3> Gilman residents clamored for their own
school district, the construction of a school, and the
hiring of a teacher.

Several citizens circulated a peti

tion for the employment of a teacher and the expense of
running a school for four months.
$270 of the $300 pledged;

These people collected

only four of the twenty-four who

pledged their support did not pay.

X6

An article in the Helena Daily Independent reported
the school dispute:

’’Apparently the Augusta people want

to control the Gilman school, which is decidedly un-AmeriX7
can.” '

The county commissioner and chairman of the board

of school trustees .in the Augusta district,

C. C. Coving

ton (who resided in Augusta) refused to allow the move.
A Gilman resident, C. W. Burns, ’’...appeared in the of
fice of the county commissioners one day with a new peti
tion asking that the district be created.”

He stated:

”1 do not represent the Gilman Commercial club nor do I
represent Mr. Bradley and the Gilman State Bank, but I

Undated petition sent to the school trustees for
the establishment of a school, Gilman School District
No. 31 papers, Archives, University of Montana.
Hereafter
cited as Gilman school papers.
17

Helena Daily Independent, date unknown, clipping
in Gilman school papers file.
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do represent the people of this d i s t r i c t . " ^
In describing the issue the Helena paper remarked:
There was a persistent rumor from the Gilman neigh
borhood to the effect that Burns forgot to in
clude one other institution among those whom he
represented— namely C. C. Covington.
At any rate
Mr. Covington suffered a complete change of heart
almost instantly and before Burns had left for
his Gilman home that afternoon Mr. Covington and
the remaining members of the board readily and
graciously agreed to give Gilman the school dis
trict ,19
Six months later, in April 1914, Gilman held elections
for school trustees and C. W. Burns ran for one of the
three posts.

At that time there was no official ballot

and the candidates had to print their own.

The other

three candidates all had their names on the same ballot;
E. D. Boone, the vice president of the Gilman bank, being
one of them..
In reporting the election the Helena Daily Independent
stated:

"All the candidates but Burns had their own ballots

printed, but one of Cpvington1s political wheels apparent
ly missed a revolution, for this important piece of politi
cal strategy was overlooked by him and his candidate."
By forgetting to have his ballots printed Burns lost the
election.

This probably had only a limited effect on

the election for he had very little support.

The news-

■^Helena Daily Independent, April 12, 1914•

paper article continued:

"That the people of Gilman did

not want Burns in the office of school trustee is shown
in the decisive manner he was beaten.

Out of the total

of 100 votes cast, Philip Mayer received 96; E. D. Boone
94; F. M. Mack 6 4 , and C. W. Burns 35.” 2°
Dissatisfied over Burn's defeat Covington stated that
the election was illegal and it was not the will of the
majority.

Again the Helena paper replied:

"The will of

the majority in this instance meant the will of Covington
who has been attempting to boss the political fortunes
of the northern part of /Lewis and Clark/ county for sev
eral years."

Concluding, the story noted:

"Although Mr.

Covington is a resident of Augusta, he was in Gilman dur
ing the entire day of the election gum-shoeing for votes
for his own candidate."

21

The problem of creating the new school district in
Gilman and the subsequent issues over the election dealt
a final blow to Bradley's aspirations for his bank, and
more importantly his town.

After that any supporters he

had left in Augusta deserted him in favor of the newly
formed Peoples Bank.

This maneuver proved without a

doubt Bradley's intentions of making Gilman completely

o0

I b i d . In this election the electorate voted for
three of the four candidates.
2lIbid.
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independent of Augusta,
more skeptical,

at the latter*s expense.

Others,

felt such action only augmented Birad ley *s

true intent in trying to eliminate Augusta.
A. L. Bradley was like many of the bankers in Montana
during this time.

These men were in such positions of

influence that they naturally became the leaders in the
community.

They had to know a little about everybody,

a lot about everything that influenced the t o w n .

and

Since

they depended on the t o w n 's economy and the local resi
dents it proved necessary to be well informed„

These

men frequently ran for local offices, especially those
that maintained the schools.

E. D. Boone's election as

a school trustee pleased Bradley and ensured still further
control of Gilman.
Bradley through his leadership in the community,
as banker and chief public relations man, attempted to
gather support from all areas.

In a letter sent to a

man inquiring about the town, he replied:

"We believe

that Gilman will make a 'cracking good town* and it will
pay you to investigate the same when you come to Mont
a n a .”22
Further writings in the local papers greatly in
tensified the split between the towns.

The flamboyant

journalism employed by the two editors in no way helped

22Letter, Bradley to 0. C. Lauch, March 16, 1912,
Gilman papers.
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Bradley heal the wounds and regain financial support from
Augusta businesses and residents.

Editorials in the

Augusta Times and the Gilman Optimist underscored the
sentiment of the two towns.

Leo J. Simpson of the Gil

man paper and Will J. Randall of the Augusta Times car
ried on tirades in their weekly papers predicting the
immediate ruin of the o t h e r ’s township.
Randall frequently referred to Bradley as ’’Old Long
Nose sitting in a gilded cage pulling the strings.”

2 oi

Local residents applauded his bombastic editorials and
his staunch supporters refused to move.

Simpson retorted

that the people in Augusta should quit worrying and re
sign themselves to A u gusta’s fate as a ’’vanishing entity.”
He ranted that they would never get the railroad and Gil
man would succeed as the leading community in the Sun
River region.
In November 1914/ Randall blasted Simpson in one of
his true-to-form editorials.

’’Were it not for the in

sistence of the Optimist in4 saying we will not get the
railroad, we would not pay any attention to it.

We know

positively that we will get the railroad and we know just
how we are going to do it.”2^

2 'I

Tape, Homer J. Wellman.

2^Augusta T i m e s . Nov. 20, 1914.

45
A year later in response to an action by Simpson
the Times observed:
After more than 2 years of fruitless effort to
get a strangle hold on Augusta and silence her
forever, he /Simpson/ has hit upon an effective
plan and by a simple twist of the wrist-prestochange-Augusta vanishes in the ethereal blue and
does not even make a blot on the snow covered
landscape.
It was all done so quietly.
No noise, no confu
sion, no blood curdling scenes or shrieks of ang
uish.
The operation was painless.
Just one
stroke of a penknife and Augusta disappeared off
that map forever.
The first knowledge of our misfortune was obtained
from the Gilman Optimist of last week.
It con
tained a map of the Sun River Valley oil field and
when we looked for Augusta, the map did not show
that there was such a place.
The editor of the
Optimist had quietly eraced /sic/ 'it. ^
The movement of the Augusta

bank toGilman,

the subse

quent formation of the Peoples Bank, the early rivalry for
the railroad,

and the division of the school districts did

not help B r a d l e y 1s attempts to establish rapport with
A u g usta’s citizens.

Lines that had separated the towns

became more clearly drawn in the

ensuing years.

The strug

gle between the banks continued;

neither one prospering.

Since the larger ranchers in the area had their banking
connections either in Helena or Great Falls, the two coun
try banks ” ...had to rely on the small businesses and pick
up the crumbs here and there as they could find them.”^

2^Augusta T i m e s . Jan. 14, 1916.
26

Tape, Homer J. Wellman.
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The newly formed Peoples Bank of Augusta loaned most
ly to small ranchers and Augusta merchants.

The bank in

Gilman had two strikes against itself after the Augusta
bank started operating.

First of all, the bank "...took

all of the slow loans out of the Augusta area when it moved
to Gilman.”

27

The more prominent businessmen and citizens

could not condone Bradley*s actions and withdrew support of
his bank when it relocated.

Secondly,

” ...the Gilman bank

loaned almost exclusively on the properties known as the
bench^S

the homesteaders, who in turn had no experience

in farming and very little chance of making good, except
oQ
in some bumper years, which did not happen. y
By splitting the business in the upper Sun River
Valley, the two banks "...had no more chance of making
money than some of the homesteaders out on the b e n c h . " ^
For example, if the bank had $150,000 worth of loans
and got 12 per cent interest

(one percent a month), that

was only $1,500 a month income.

In addition, the bank

borrowed from the customers in the way of time certificates
of deposit and had to pay six percent interest.

This

^7lbid.
ry

Q

The name bench referred to the benchland areas north
of Gilman.
Land of this nature was generally on rolling
pleateau regions above river valleys and canyons.
29

Tape, Homer J, Wellman.

3°Ibid.
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expense, plus the salaries of the bank employees,

and the

cost of doing business--the overhead of the building,
utilities, taxes,

interest, insurance, etc.— left a very

thin margin for doing b u s i n e s s . ^
After the bank moved to Gilman the election of new
officers and directors took place.

Bradley remained as

president, Boone as vice president, and Abbey as cashier.
Directors included:

M. M. Connor, Alex Chisholm (later a

director of the Augusta bank), Oliver Bernier, G. B.
Christian, Harry Lord, and the three b a n k ’s officers.

II

Gilman, located in the heart of the Sun River Valley,
was a community of about 250 people in 1913.

Speculation

had it at one time that the town might reach several thou
sand .

It had the usual lumber yards, general stores,

3 In December, 1920 the Gilman bank president received
$225 salary per month, the cashier received $190, and the
assistant cashier $175— this totaled $590.
In addition
the monthly average for expenses that year was $1,1 7 0 ; ad
ded to salaries this brought the total to $1,760.
Loans
in December 1920 reached $204,000.
Average monthly interest
(figured on a 12 percent yearly basis) was $2,040.
That
left just about $280 with which to transact business— very
definitely a thin margin.
Report of the Condition of the
Gilman State B a n k . Dec. 29, 1920, Gilman papers.
Here
after cited as Gilman Condition Report (with given year) .
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jewelry shop, meat market, elevator,
and

s a l o o n s .

8^

stock yards, hotels

The completion of the railroad in Decem

ber 1912 opened the way for the development of the area
under the Sun River Irrigation Project.

The intent of

such a project was to open the Sun River Valley region to
irrigated farm land, in addition to controlling spring
run-off.
The entire Sun River project made up five separate
units ranging from the foot of the Rocky Mountains east
ward to Great Falls.

These units included:

Greenfield,

Sun River Slope, Big Coulee, Mill Coulee, and Fort Shaw.
It comprised portions of three different counties— the
southeastern part of Teton county, northwestern Cascade,
and northern Lewis and Clark county.
Before the advent of this project the Sun River region
depended heavily on stock raising as its principal commo
dity.

The buffalo,

dance of good grass.

like the cattle herds,

found an abun

The Blackfeet abounded here due to

a storehouse of meat and other edible forage.

The white

m a n ’s westward movement pushed the Indians off this land
and by the l S 8 0 fs they had been placed on reservations.
The white settlers found hunting and trapping facili
ties very enticing and remained to locate in the area.

The

Sun River provided a bountiful water supply ideal for

32

Letter, Abbey to Ramaley, Aug. 27, 1912, Gilman papers.
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settlement.

One writer quite aptly described the Sun River:

The little stream which, like a silvery ribbon
joins the metropolis of Montana to the pleasures
of the mountains, was well named when called the
river of the Sun.
Flowing almost directly east
and west, both the morning and evening sun reflect
in this stream.33
Stockmen drove their herds from western Montana and
Idaho into the Sun River Valley soon after the construction
of the Fort Shaw Military Post.

Completed in 1869, the

fort prevented "...marauding Indian parties from driving off
live'stock.’*34

Many ranchers located in the foothills and

stream valleys that fed the Sun River.

"The land taken up

by the early stockmen was chiefly bottom lands suitable for
pasture and for the production of wild hay, winter grazing
lands, and land on which water holes were located."35
An editorial in the Great Falls Tribune in 1905, in
anticipation of the Sun River project stated:
Nothing in the history of this part of the country
has been undertaken that means so much for Great
Falls as the irrigation of the Sun River lands,
both north and south of the river.
The comple
tion of this work alone will mean at least 25,000
additional people in this c i t y .39

33

Great Falls Tribune. May 1, 1932.

^ M o n t a n a Experiment Station, Soils of Lewis and Clark
C o u n t y . Bulletin 445 (Bozeman:
Montana State College, 1947),
20 .
35I b i d .,
36

21.

Great Falls T r i bune. Sept. 2 4, 1905.
See the popula
tion statistics of Great Falls on page 9, footnote 10.
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In another editorial that same year the project
gained rhetorical acclaim:
Out of the deep canyon fortresses of the main
chain of the Rockies, where gray granite and
white limestone pierce the clouds, flowing east-r
ward from the continental divide, pours down the
Sun river, a crystal, icy, rushing torrent, leap
ing over precipitate heights and surging through
narrow and impassable gorges.
Would man bridle and tame such an untamed bron
cho of the wild western country, running its
fierce, unchecked course, and make it do plebian
duty on the agricultural plains and valleys be-I -

f-.__.l_

_•

j_l_ _■

^

tile desert loam
Sun waters.37

O

a c r e g

Q f

f e T -

touch of the

The whole Sun River Project was in its infancy in
1913 when Gilman began to establish itself as a potential
economic center of the valley.

The Reclamation Service at

that time began building Diversion Dam on the North Fork
of the Sun River (20 miles northwest of Gilman), and con
structing 54 miles of main irrigation canal.
a 1000 man payroll.

This entailed

In addition to being the headquarters

for the Reclamation Service’s offices and supplies, Gilman
was at the terminus of the 20 mile road constructed to the
,
38
dam site.
The majority of the workers spent their wages and
leisure time in Gilman.

Those that had a mind for thrifti

ness deposited their money in the Gilman bank.

"For the

next ^several.71 years Gilman continued to grow with its popu

37I b i d ., March 1, 1905.
3^I b i d ., March 29, 1959.
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lation being estimated variously between 500 and 600.
became a center of the area.

It

Farmers and ranchers gather

ed here for fairs and rodeos and Fourth of July celebraOQ
tions. Money flowed freely. Things looked good.”0
Mr. Bradleyfs

"gilded cage” prospered.

Completion of Diversion Dam, and in later years Gibson
Dam,

changed the agricultural complexion of the region.

Irrigation altered the range country from intensive stock
raising to a mixture of grain crops and livestock.
longer did stock raising remain so predominant.

No

By 1921,

C. W. Tewell, then cashier of the Gilman State Bank, wrote
to a stockholder that ” ... about half of our territory is
grain and the other half livestock.”
The rapid change of the region into a grain growing
section necessitated the alteration of much of the stock
grazing land.

Local farmers borrowed from the bank to buy

the necessary

equipment.

The

Gilman

State Bank

andthe

rival Peoples

Bank of Augusta

had to

also alter

their own

banking methods.

The officers and directors knew very

little about grain crops.

Until that time the banks d e 

pended almost entirely on the livestock in the area.

They

got along fine through the wet years, but when the dry
years arrived it was not only the farmers that suffered,
but also these two Ipanks.

^ Ibid

.

^ L e t t e r , Tewell to Charles G. Reynolds, Aug. 10,
1921, Gilman papers.

52
The majority of the depositors and borrowers that
depended on the Gilman bank for their services had home
steads on the Fairfield bench.

This region covered sev

eral hundred square miles northeast of Gilman extending
from Spring Valley to the town of Fairfield, some 25 miles
away.

The bank did have patronizers that lived south of

Augusta, but the bank in Augusta handled the majority of
that business*

Some of the farmers east of Gilman sup

ported the bank, but most of them did their business in
Simms and consequently did their banking in the same place.
Located west of Gilman abopt 15 milqs were the Rocky
Mountains.

There was limited farming in this area due to

the rocky slopes of the mountains;

stock raising prpved to

be most profitable and less strenuous than cultivation of
grain crops*
A bulletin published by Montana State College in 1927
thoroughly desribed the region around Gilman.
of the Fairfield benph have been termed
vary in texture.

"The soils

TFairfieldr ...and

Rounded gravels are encountered just be

low plow depth and may increase ip. number until a distinct
gravelly loam layer is encountered.”41
North, of Gilman on the level land of the Sun River
Slope the soil is termed,

”Pishkun.”

”In some cases the

^ M o n t a n a Experiment Station, Soil Survey of the Sun
River Irrigation Project. Bulletin 20 7 (Bozeman:
Montana
State College, 1927),
10-5*
Hereafter cited as Sun River
Soil S u r v e y , Bulletin 20 7.

53
upper 2 or 3 inches of the surface soil contains but a
small percentage of very fine gravels, but below this to
a depth of 10 to 12 inches the gravel content is high
and larger in diameter.11^
The farmers east of Gilman planted their grains in
"Simms silt loam" because this soil predominated in the
vicinity of the town of Simms.

This type of earth origin

ates from recent stream deposits and is comparatively free
of gravel particles.

This soil has a tendency to become

water-logged, but it is better than either Fairfield or
Pish k u n .43
None of these soils was conducive to dry land farming,
and the gravel content in Fairfield and Pishkun types made
irrigation almost hopeless, except for anything but stock
r a i s i n g .

44

The tendency of Simms loam to become water

logged when irrigated also altered standard farming pro
cedures.

The inexperienced homesteaders in this region

knew little about soil content,

42Ibid.,

21.

43Ibid.,

30.

44

let alone even some of the

,
See Mary Wilma M. Hargreaves, Dry Farming xn the
Northern Great Plains (Cambridge:
Harvard University
Press, 1957) • Thomas Shaw, Dry Farming (St. Paul:
The
Pioneer Company 1911).
John Witsoe, Dry Farming (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1920).
Montana Experiment Station
Dry F a m i n g in M o n t a n a . Bulletin 63 (Bozeman:
Montana State
College, 190 7)• Montana Experiment Station, Dry Farming in
North Central Montana Triangle. Bulletin 66 (Bozeman:
Mont
ana State College, 1923 .
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basic considerations of grain farming.

It is no wonder

that these farmers could not get the yields that they
had hoped.

When times proved rough during the good years,

failure and bankruptcy prevailed during the dry ones.
To make things even more difficult for the farmers,
’’...the Sun River Project was within the region affected
by chinooks.

These warm winds were of benefit to stockmen

in taking the snow off the range, but with the change to
dry farming they occasioned a loss of moisture and laid the
land bare and subject to blowing.”45
When the dry years began ” ...many homesteaders loaded
all their goods on lumber-wagons and left their shacks to
look for greener pasture; the little town of Gilman began
feeling the bite of depression.’1^

Rain that once fell

from the sky in profusion was now as reliable as a slow
train.
The 30 year rainfall average for the Sun River (11.0 9
i n c h e s ) ^ from 1888 to 1918 was not as high as that for
48
the entire state (15.78)
in an equivalent period.
In
fact, the least amount of rainfall desirable for dry land

4~*Sun River Soil Sur v e y , Bulletin 207,

6-7•

^ Great Falls Tribune. March 29, 1959*
47 '
Montana *s Resources. 1919,
48

38*

The state average covered a 31 year period from
1894 to 1925* M o n t a n a ’s Resources. 1926,
17«
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farming was 15 i n c h e s . ^

Four inches on the Sun River

during the ” wet years’1 meant a lot of difference; during
the arid years it was disastrous.
The Gilman bank depended on farmery that lived in
three different counties— Lewis and Clark, Teton and
Cascade .50

49

In 1916, three of the six counties that re-

M o n t a n a ’s Resources. 1923,

37.

50
TABLE 2
PRECIPITATION IN MONTANA FROM
1916-1919; MEASURED IN INCHES
Year

State

Lewis and Clark

Teton

Cascade

1916
1917
1918
1919

17.90
13.64
13.85
15.77

18 .96
15.50
11.18
12.77

18.88
11.05
6.43
17.08

21.60
22.31
12.32
15.14

Six Highest Counties
Y ear

Average

1916

23.20

1917

19.88

1918

19.70

1919

19.63

Counties
(Hill, Gallatin, Cascade, Sanders,
Beaverhead and Custer)
(Carbon, Lincoln, Sweet Grass. Pow
ell, Cascade and Sanders)
(Gallatin, Sanders, Stillwater,
Beaverhead. Sweet Grass
and Carbon)
(Beaverhead, Gallatin, Carbon, Fer
gus, McCone and Lincoln)
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ported the most precipitation were northern and central
counties:
Sanders,

Hill, 20.70 inches; Cascade,
25.90 inches.

21.6,0 inches,

The six lowest, with an overall

average of 12.90 were all southern counties:
Wheatland, Meagher,

and

Big Horn,

Carter, Park and Jefferson.

Two years-later a complete reversal occurred.

The

counties reporting the least amount of moisture were alj
northern and central counties:

Teton, Blaine,

Toole,

Chouteau> Phillips and Hil'l--the average was 8.71 inches.
That same year only one porthepn county, Sanders, was
among the top six that reported the most precipitation
and it ranked fifth.

Clearly the years of drought hit the

northern counties first.
It was not until 1918 that the Gilman region felt the
effect of the lean years.

In an August letter of that

year CJ. W. Tewell commented on the condition of the area:
" I t won't be a good yield because the early grain suffered

Six Lowest Counties
Average

1916

12.90

1917

8 .10

1918

00
•
'O
H

Y ear

1919

12.81

Counties
(Big Horn, Wheatland, Meagher, Car
ter, Park and Jefferson)
(Sheridan, Valley, Carter, Meagher,
Phillips and Blaine)
(Teton, Blaine, Toole, Chouteau,
Phillips and Hill)
(Ravalli, Blaine, Lewis and Clark,
Custer and Valley)

Montana's Resources. 1917-1920.
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by the drought quite a little.

I just returned from the

Shelby country and feel pretty well satisfied with the
country here.

I didn*t sep a $pear of green grass in

that whole country and the grain in many places never
sprouted at all.”

51

A year later Tewell informed Percy Abbey:

"...things

are well dried out;..even the stock ranchers are going to
have to ship about all of their cattle because of the
shortage of hay and pasture.

Rain coming now would make

the feed pretty good, but the grain I think is shot."^2
By 1921 agricultural conditions had not improved.
In August,

Tewell wrote a stockholder:

"The local situa

tion, disappointing as it is from the view of our early
expectations is paradise compared with some other sections
of the country."

He continued with a personal observa

tion— "While this does not help us materially it seems
there is enough meanness in the average human being so
that he usually derives a little satisfaction, poor tho
it is, from the fact that some other fellow has a heavier
load to carry or a worse lot to

s h a r e .

"“*3

51

Letter, Tewell to Harry Lord, Aug. 14, 1918,
Gilman papers.
52
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papers.

Letter, Tewell to Abbey, July 8, 1919, Gilman papers.
Letter, Tewpll to Reynolds, Aug. 10, 1921, Gilman
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The rainfall increased gradually from 1920 to 1923
on the Sun River, but the drought had already done its
damage.Farmers,

ranchers, merchants, and most of all

the bankers, all prayed for moisture.

The 1919 edition

of the bulletin, The Resources and Opportunities of
M o n t a n a . expressed this feeling appropriately:
The people of the state are undaunted and are
making the usual preparations for the season
of 1920.
It is pointed out that Montana has
never before in its history had three seasons
in succession as dry as the seasons of 1917,
1918 and 1919.
From this it is argued that
the state will surely come back in 1920.55
The state did come back, but it came back gradually.
Agriculturally it was too late for the Gilman bank.
pendent on a narrow economy,

De

inexperienced farmers who

worked the poor soil on the bench and the uncertain years
after 1917, the bank could not remain open.
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On November

TABLE 3
ANNUAL PRECIPITATION OF THE SUN
RIVER PROJECT FROM 1920-1923;
MEASURED IN INCHES

Year

Amount

1920
1921
1922
1923

9.50
10.25
13.17
15.83

Montana Experiment Station, An Analysis of the Present
Status of Agriculture on the Sun River Irrigation Project.
Bulletin 321 (Bozeman:
Montana State College, 1936), 3 3 .
Hereafter cited as Agriculture on the Sun River Irrigation
Project. Bulletin 321.
cc
M o n t a n a ’s R e s o urces. 1919,

6.

2 8 , 1923, the b a n k ’s officers closed the doors of the Gil
man State Bank to be reopened in the hands of a receiver
appointed by the state Superintendent of Banks.

Ill

Along with the surge in population the movement of
the honyocker to the West rapidly increased the number of
farms.

From 1910 to 1920 M o n t a n a ’s population increased by

46 percent While the number of farms multiplied by 120
percent.-*

Lewis and Clark County showed a 38 percent

addition in farms.

By 1925 the state lost 19 percent of

TABLE 4
CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF FARMS
IN MONTANA DURING
SELECTED YEARS
Year

State

1900
1910
1920
1925
1930

13,370
26,214
57,677
46,904
47,495

Lewis and Clark
531
529
8 55
543
612

Teton

Cascade

347
1,187
1,135
1,089
1,023

1,144
1,502
1,703
1,257
1,404

U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920:
Agriculture,
VI,- 106, and the U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1 9 3 0 »
Agriculture, II,
118.
Hereafter cited as Fourteenth Census
of the United States, 1 9 2 0 : Agriculture. and the Fifteenth
Census of the United States, I.930* . Agriculture.
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the farms and Lewis arid Clark recorded a loss of almost
one-third of all its farms*

Of that number the majority

of those failures in the county occurred from 1922-1925The abandpnment of 273 o'f the county *s farms transpired
during that time.

Changes were not as dramatic in Teton

and Cascade counties during this period.
The sudden loss of farms also drastically lowered
the value of land.

In 1921 a letter from the b a n k ’s cashier

to a loan company in Great Falls revealed the poor shape
of one of the Gilman farmers.

The letter read:

holding the land at $15-00 per acre.

”We are

There are better

than $1500 worth of improvements on the place and we es
timate that it places the raw land at about $9.00 per
ry
acre.
The Sun River Valley did not fair as well as the
rest of the state in comparison of land value.
The average piece of land per acre in 1920 in the
state (buildings included) was $22.15; by 1925 a loss of

cry

Letter, Tewell to Lord, June 28, 1921, Gilman
papers.
This 310 acre plot was 25 miles northwest of
Gilman in Teton county.
It was probably a mixture of
non-irrigated farming land and grazing land due to its
location at the base of the Rocky Mountains.
In 1920
land varied in Teton county from $75 tp $100 an acre for
irrigated land, $20 to $100 an acre for improved non
irrigated tracts, and $8 to $15 an acre for grazing land.
At $9 an acre for raw land the farmer was barely getting
the minimum for grazing l a n d . M o n t a n a ’s Resources,
1920,
18 5-

6.1
approximately $8.00 per acre occurred.

5^

This compared

with a $7*00 loss in Lewis and Clark county,

a $11.50

loss in Teton and over a $17.00 decrease in Cascade.
This meant on the average a loss of approximately $1,500
to $3,090 a farm.

Such a loss could not be absorbed

readily by farmers that were already in a precarious posi
tion with their banker.
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TABLE 5
AVERAGE VALUE OF LAND AND
BUILDING PER ACRE IN
1920, 1925, and 1930

Year

State

1920
1925
1930

$22.15
13.91
11.81

Lewis and Clark
$18.44
11.64
10.61

Teton

Cascade

$27.06
15.56
15.44

$33-68
16 .44
17.20

TABLE 6
AVERAGE VALUE OF LAND AND
BUILDING PER FARM IN '
1920, 1925, and 1930
Year

State

1920
1925
1930

$13,468
9,709
11,109

Lewis and Clark
$16,264
17,017
16,415

•

Teton

Cascade

$14,628
11,684
14,721

$24,763
13,836
15,448

Fourteenth Census of the United States. 1920:
Agri
culture , VI,
106, and the Fifteenth Census of the United
States, 1930 * Agriculture, II,
128.

For example, the typical Gilman farmer had a small
320 acre farm, valued at $6,000, with a mortgage on it*
He usually owned a model^T Ford, 3 or 4 pieces of small
machinery--a tractor and a plow, accompanied by small
tools and garage equipment.

He had 5 ho 10 head of cattle

(which he hoped to sell to pay off his first bank note),
a milk cow;, 100 tons of alfalfa and 80 to 100 acres
planted in wheat.

The farm also had various acres in

potatoes, corn, rye, barley, and flax.

The average farmer

was barely making it in 1920 and with such a tremendous
reduction in the value of land a reduction occurred in his
ability to repay his loan or mortgage at the bank.
Some hope remained in the Sun River Canyon that land
value would increase.
in the region.

This hope rested on oil speculation

Drilling had become a common practice by

1914 on the Sun River.

When the dry years set in many

Gilman residents believed that oil strikes would relieve
the declining economy.

Oil discoveries in Wyoming and

north-central Montana gave encouragement to the Sun River
land owners that their luck would change.

Such was not

the case for the area did not produce a single well— even
today oil companies have continued to drill, but to no
avail.
Stockholders and officers of the Gilnan bank, like
the community’s citizens, also believed that oil might be

the secret fqr relieving the financial pressue in the
valley.

Although the bank did not invest in any such

ventures many of the people that owed money to the bank
participated in oil speculation.

By 1918, C. W. Tewell

revealed the disenchantment with the poor outlook in
response to a letter inquiring about the oil drilling.
"It has been such a long winded business that I have lost
some of my enthusiasm about it, but they ,/the oil companiejs/ seem to be stickers.1' ^
A year later the situation had not improved and
prompted one of the b a n k ’s stockholders to write to Tewell:
"I am sorry the oil well is at a standstill.

Seems as

tho the devil has a hand in preventing the completion of
the well.

Down 2000 ft, and now must abandon it!"

ly he noted,

Joking

"I?ll bet t h e y ’ll find a German spy down there

monkeying with those tools.

Of course, t h e r e ’s oil there,

but t h e r e ’s German i n t e r f e r e n c e . " ^
After 1919 prospects for oil promotion looked bleak.
C. W. Tewell, in correspondence with another stockholder,
Charles G. Reynolds,

commented about a local oil firm:

"I am afraid the Sun River Oil stock is a rather poor in
vestment.

co
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papers.

They are doing nothing here and I cannot get a

Letter,

Tewell to Lord, Aug. 17, 1918, Gilman papery.

Letter, Reynolds to Tewell, July 27 3 1919, Gilman
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word out of them.

It would appear now as tho they were

just a prqmotion company and organized just for the pur
pose of selling stock.
A more successful firm from outside the region, the
Wyomont Oil and Gas Company, quickly capitalized on the
declining interest in Sun River Oil stocks.

In a 1919

form letter to the Sun River shareholders the Wyomont
Company attempted to lure new customers by trading their
stock for that of the "worthless” Montana corporation.
The letter stated:
The basis on which the stock will be exchanged
is one for five— one share of Wyomont stock for
five shares of Sun River.
You will have fewer
shares of the new stock than you had of the old,
but the par value will be twice as much, and
we firmly believe that the real value will soon
be several times as m u c h .62
The failure in oil speculation, the decline in land
value, and the subsequent days of meager rainfall accom
panied the drop in agricultural prices.

Wheat prices

fell so drastically in Montana in 1919 that the state lost
$50,000,000.

Not only did drought effectively hamper

production, but severe winters, lasting well into spring
cut the production of grain crops.

f\1

Letter, Tewell to Reynolds, Aug. 10, 1921, Gilman
papers.
62

.

,

Letter, F. P. Motie (Secretary of the Wyomont Oil
and Gas Co.) to stockholders of Sun River Oil and Gas Co.,
April 11, 1919, Gilman papers.
63

Toole, Montana:

An Uncommon Land,

235*6.
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A letter from Tewell to a corresponding bank in
June 1918 stressed the problem of no moisture:

'’Owing to

the long dry period of time we have had, the farmers on
the benches around us will have short crops, especially
will this be true of their winter wheat."^4
later Tewell stressed that:

Three months

"I think if the yield around

here will average ten bushels we will be doing well this
year,"^,
1

This compared with a state average of 12.3 bush-

els per acre.
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By 1919, in correspondence with Harry Lord,

Tewell

explained his concern about the outlook for wheat:

"Our

grain crop here is practically nothing--the winter wheat
in some places is running about 3 bushels per acre and
the spring wheat as a rule ^jhas not been/ cut for feed.
^y
The feed shortage is, however, our greatest worry."
In 1919 Montana averages for wheat production fell under
ZL O

five bushels per acre.
Mr. Tewell's fears for feed shortage were real ones.

f\A
Letter, Tewell to the Northwestern National Bank,
Minneapolis, June 2 7, 1918, Gilman papers.
^Letter,
66
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Tewell to Lord, Sept. 24, 1918, Gilman papers.

Montana's Resou rces. 1919*

28.

Letter, Tewell to Lord, Oct. 16, 1919, Gilman papers.
Montana's Resources. 1920,

27.

The state shipped in nearly $45^000^000 worth of feed for
livestock in 1919 to save the cattle and sheep industry.
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Ranchers around Gilman were in the same predicament as
their fellow Montanans.

Livestock owners in the area

bought slough grass that had been cut around the lakes of
Minnesota.

This grass had. little nourishment but was

still sold for as much as $50 a ton.
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The price of cattle dropped correspondingly with the
decrease in wheat.

Many ranchers, like the wheat farmers,

did not want to sell owing to the continuous decline in
prices.

They held out as long as possible but had to

sell eventually to meet daily operating expenses and
overdue bank loans.
dwindled.

After 1919 Montana cattle herds

The state had over a million head of cattle

and by 1920 the number totaled only 900,000.

This loss o f ■

such magnitude meant a monetary loss of nearly $22,000,0 0 0 .
M o n t a n a ’s entire economy had been dramatically altered
by the land and wheat boom during World War I«

From

'

1909 to 1925 Montana split its counties and increased the

^Elliott,
^Tape,
71

"Commercial Bank Failures,

Homer J. Wellman.

M o n t a n a ’s Resources. 1920,

36,

1920-1926,"

50*
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number from 33 to 5 6 .

In that time the .influx of

inex-^

perienced homesteaders into the state changed the whole
complexion of Montana*s economy, and more drastically its
banking structure.

The Gilman State Bank was caught in

this whirlwind of change.

"Suffice it to say that it was

an enormously costly experiment...thus when the drought
came— -and with it the grasshoppers; even the cutworm com72
peted with the homesteader for control."''6

72

Dalich,

"Dry Farming Promotion, 1907-1916,"

85.

CHAPTER III

LOAN FACTORS OF
THE BANK
I
Loans played the major role in the operation of the
Gilman State Bank during the days of the honyockers.
loan experience was of three types.

This

First of all, eastern

bank inquiries for local bank and farm loans before 1918
were very important.

Secondly, when the dry years pre

vailed the Gilman bank requested loans from these eastern
banking corporations and used local loans as collateral
for the money it borrowed;
ruptcy,

Thirdly,

to forestall bank

local farmers flooded the Gilman bank with loan

requests.
As a new bank in the state in 1910 the Augusta State
Bank received many letters of inquiry from eastern banks
concerning its affiliation with them as a correspondent
bank.

Many of the large banks in New York, Chicago and

Minneapolis served as correspondent banks for those in
the west that did not belong to the Federal Reserve System.
This made it possible for western institutions to borrow
at a low rate of ipterest and have their loans rediscounted.

^Rediscount. This is a transaction undertaken by one
bank desiring funds from another bank.
By this means the
bank desiring funds presents a discount (a note it has ac
cepted from a customer to run for a specified length of
time) to another bank in order to get an advance.
In turn,

68

69
The National City Bank, of Chicago (a bank only three
years old), wrote a typical

letter in March^l910 inquir

ing about the Augusta bank as a correspondent:

"While

sentiment cuts very little figure in the banking business
as a general proposition, we feel that,

all things being

equal, there should be a 'fellow feeling' between new
banks.This

bank, like the other eastern banks, offer

ed to pay 2 percent interest annually on money placed in
its bank.

These banks also loaned money to western insti

tutions at a rate of 6 percent, usually for a 60-90 day
period.
Insurance companies also realized the potential of
the western states and had their own methods of tapping
this resource.

The New World Life Insurance Company,

as

one example, proposed a plan of mutual benefit for itself
and the newly formed bank.
tion,

"Its a businessman's proposi

'pure and simple,'" the plan stated.

"We have the

money to deposit with you right now, provided we can do
so on reciprocal terms.

We will put a substantial de

posit in your bank provided that you will help us get in-

the bank which presents the note for rediscount endorses
it, thereby guaranteeing that it will be paid at maturity.
H. Parker Willis, American Banking (Chicago:
Chicago,
LaSalle Extension University, 1916),
165.
2

Letter, Elmer E. Whittaker to Abbey, April 12, 1910,
Gilman papers.
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surance either by acting as an agent of the Company your
self, or helping us secure an active agent to do this
work in your locality.”^
Surety firms,4 likewise, had an interest in reaping
the resources f r o m .the newly arriving homesteaders.

The

Wells-Dickey Company of Minneapolis handled such a tre
mendous volume of farm mortgages and municipal bonds in
central Montana that it opened a branch office in 1913
in Great Falls.

Six months after they had established

themselves local agents informed the Gilman bank officers:
"No loan is too small and none too large for our considera
tion, if the margin of security is sufficient and the man
behind the gun worthy of credit.”^
Other companies were just as willing to extend
credit but were more selective on the type of loans they

3
Letter, New World Life Insurance Co. to Abbey, July
9, 1914* Gilman papers.
^Surety. This is a financial institution which
operates in the commercial field as an acceptance house.
The company does not advance funds, but only guarantees
the credit of the drawer by accepting true obligations
drawn against them, which are later sold in the financial
market.
The purchasers of these obligations advance the
funds and the acceptance house acts only in the capacity
of guarantor.
Luther Harr and W. Carlton Harris, Banking
Theory and Practice (New York and London:
MaGraw-HilL
Book Co. Inc., 1936),
18.
^Letter, Edwin H. Jones to the Augusta State Bank,
Aug. 28 ,. 1913^ Gilman papers.

would, handle from the farmers#

Keeler Brothers,

a Den

ver firm that desired to accommodate large borrowers,
requested only ten year loans, "...as the livestock pro*

ducer then has ample time to increase his herd to where
his entire debt can be easily paid, and the cattle which
are sold can be held for the most favorable market."
a short term loan," the company stressed,

"On

"it is not un

common that ./the rancher^/ is forced to sell his cattle
off the range to meet maturing obligations."^
This is exactly what happened during the dry era.
The outside banks and investors,

following sound business

principles, Wanted loans only during good times and for
long periods.

The short term loans did not prove produc

tive enough, and in the dry years they were too risky.
One firm in 1914 requested that "...farm loans be
n
made upon improved farms only."
This meant that the
company handled loans only on land that had one quarter
of the claim under cultivation.

In 1916 the Banking Cor

poration of Montana requested only specialized loans.
The company wanted "mixed farming loans ranging from
$10,000 to $250>000.

By mixed farming the company meant

lands devoted to hay, grain for feed and various livestock

Letter, Keeler Brothers to the Gilman State Bank,
March 6, 1916, Gilman papers.
7
Letter, R. H. Carstens to Abbey, Feb. 27, 1914,
Gilman papers.
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o
production.”

Still other companies desired loans on

cattle ranches that maintained a certain number of head.
They loaned on amounts usually over $5/000.
The specialization of these loans--mixed farming
loans, improved loans, big business loans over $10,000,
long term loans, and cattle loans— made the borrowing of
money extremely easy for the homesteaders.

Outside cor

porations did a good business and they left enough small
loans for the bank in Gilman so that everyone prospered.
However, when these companies refused to extend loans d ur
ing the troubled years, it placed financial pressure on
the local bank.

The Gilman bank had to handle all of the

loans, .in addition to the ones deemed too small by eastern
corporations.
When prosperity vanished these companies were no
longer eager to help the "western homesteader."

In 1920

the Gilman State Bank received a letter from the Portland
Cattle Loan Company that politely refused any offers for
future loans.

"Due to the large amount of commitments

and the present tightening of the money market, it would
be impossible for us to consider the good business which
you offer at this time."^

Q

Letter, George L. Ramsey to the Gilman State Bank,
June 1, 1916, Gilman papers.
9

Letter, W. A. Willis to the Gilman State Bank,
May 19, 1920, Gilman papers.
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Another cattle company was a bit more direct:

’’The

present uncertainty of the money market and financial
outlook _/makes it/ necessary for us to demand retirement
of our loans at maturity provided security can be liquidated
without loss.1'

The company concluded, noting:

"There is

no market for commercial paper /promissory notes;/ — con
sequently there is no other alternative than liquidation.""^
The key to this type of business was that these com
panies waited for the loans to mature, hoping they did
not take a loss.

Such companies handled so many loans,

in so many different regions, that a loss on one loan in
Gilman was just written off the books.
not as eass' for the Gilman bank.

However, this was

Since the loans were

restricted to a single region the bank could not depend
on loans in other areas to keep the bank solvent.

The

only way to accomplish solvency was to continue advancing
second and third loans hoping for good weather and the
eventual repayment of all the loans.
At its formation the bank also received a completely
different type of inquiry from a Council Bluffs company
that specialized in bank stocks.

Rather than an inquiry

concerning loans the Iowa firm requested to buy out the
newly formed bank.

The company wondered if the Augusta

Letter, Spokane Cattle Loan Co. to the Gilman
State Bank, May 19, 1920, Gilman papers.

bank "would like to have private aid in disposing of its
present banking interests?”

It promised quiet negotia

tions and stressed that there was no need to "...fear a
violation of confidence."

11

Several weeks later in a follow-up letter the same
company suggested that "...even you may have had the
opportunity to go into a larger bank and have turned it
down because of the fear of publicity in disposing of
your present banking interests."

The letter continued,

” ...bank selling at first blush would seem to be an un
heard of thing.

In times gone by a banker simply had to

hang on to his bank because there was no reliable house
through whom he could quietly sell."

The company advised

"Do not think that it is necessary to hunt for buyers
after you consent to sell.

We have hundreds of them

anxious to locate at once in your section of the coun
try."12
The author of the letter from the Council Bluffs
company was wrong in presupposing that bankers* attitudes
— particularly A. L. Bradley*s--had changed concerning
the retainment of their small banks.

Very few bankers,

Letter, R. W. Walters to the Augusta State Bank,
Oct. 10, 1911, Gilman papers.
12

Letter, R. W. Walters to the Augusta State Bank,
Oct. 27t 1911, Gilman papers.
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or stockholders for that matter,
ing houses.

sold to outside clear

Most of these banks had been started by-

local residents for their convenience, as well as for
the small profits they returned.

More importantly, these

bank officials had a moral obligation to the community
and selling their bank was out of the question.
The Gilman State Bank and its personnel rigidly
followed this philosophy.

Since it was the bank officials

that were instrumental in starting the town of Gilman it
would be illogical to assume that these men were anything
but faithful to their bank.

Bradley was unlike other

bank presidents because he had his reputation staked on
the success or failure of the community.

He felt that

the success of the town relied heavily on the success of
the bank, and did all he could to keep the b a n k ’s doors
open .
For all his manipulations to establish Gilman, making
enemies in the process, Mr. Bradley can never be accused
of failing the town or the bank.

Although he lacked ex

perience in banking and knowledge about wheat farming,
he made up for it in organization and his willingness to
sacrifice friendship to achieve one goal— making Gilman
the most prosperous community in the Sun River Valley.
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II

The second factor that had a significant part in
the b a n k ’s loan experience involved the direct borrowing
from other banking institutions.

The Gilman State Bank

was no exception and utilized this opportunity only during
certain times of the year.

These loans could be obtained

on long or short terms, but the usual terms were up to
90 days.

In 1918 in a typical letter stating the Gilman

b a n k ’s position, C, W. Tewell wrote to an Illinois bank:
MIt has been our practice to borrow during the spring and
summer months to take care of the demands on us and we
take up in the fall when the cattle shipments are made to
the Chicago m a r k e t s . 3
From 1918 onward the reduction in agricultural pro
ductivity forced the local farmers to make constant de
mands on the Gilman bank for loans.
seasonal borrowing vanished.

The complexion of

The demands by area farmers

for financial relief compelled the bank to seek aid from
its correspondent banks.
In August 1919>
Bank of Great Falls

"^Letter,
man papers.

Tewell wrote to the First National
(its correspondent bank in Montana)

Tewell to H. R. Drew,

Oct. 25» 1918, Gil
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to handle some cattle loans.

At that time Tewell stated

he expected loans to be ’’...larger than /the bank/ could
c a r r y S a m

Stephenson, then president of the First

National Bank, replied that his bank could not carry the
loans due to the ’’...unsettled conditions of the times.
Two months later the state bank in Gilman wrote a
similar letter to its corresponding bank in Illinois (The
First National Bank of Joliet) requesting a renewal on
its $15*000 in certificates of d e p o s i t . ^

The bank agreed

to renew the certificates for one year at a rate of 6 per
cent .^7
On December 17* 1919*

Tewell requested help from

another corresponding bank (The Northwest National Bank
of Minneapolis).

He commented:

"The unusually hard and

"^Letter, Tewell to the First National Bank of Great
Falls, Aug. 15* 1919* Gilman papers.
"^Letter, Sam Stephenson to the Gilman State Bank,
Aug. 19* 1919* Gilman papers.
16

Letter, Tewell to the First National Bank of Joliet,
Oct. 17* 1919* Gilman papers.
Certificates of d e p o s i t .
Certificates of deposit are issued by banks for money left
on deposit for short or long time periods.
These deposits
are payable on demand or at a stated time and usually draw
interest at a stated rate.
A certificate of deposit is
an elastic instrument, through which a bank may accommodate
the customer who desires interest on deposits that are not
likely to remain until the close of interest periods in
the savings department.
William H. Kniffin, Commercial
Banking (New York:
MaGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc.^ 192 3)*
477.
•^Letter, Harry R. Drew to Tewell, Oct. 21* 1919*
Gilman papers.
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early winter has created a heavy demand on us for money.
For an ordinary year we estimated we had a sufficient
cash reserve to carry us partly thru the seeding season
but the high prices for feeds have made heavy inroads
in that."

He continued by requesting a loan to aid in

the bank's relief:

"Can you take us for ten or fifteen
-I O

thousand dollars?"

The bank readily accepted the loan

on a 6 percent annual b a s i s . ^
That same day Tewell sent an exact duplicate letter
to the First National Bank of St. Paul.
much the same.

The reply was

The Minnesota bank agreed on the loan pro

vided its correspondent in Montana backed the notp with
good collateral.^
The refusal by the bank in Great Falls to aid the
Gilman bank, and the help offered by the three mid-western
banks, lends credence to the economic problems at that
time.

Montana banks in 1919 had reached the stage where

loans of any type— be they loans to fellow banks, or the
acceptance of farm loans for collateral on certificates of
deposit— were no longer assets, but liabilities.

l8Letter, Tewell to R. W. MacGregor, Dec. 17, 1919,
Gilman papers.
19

Letter, MacGregor to Tewell, Dec. 22, 1919, Gil
man papers.
20

Letter, M. Skinner to Tewell, Dec. 22, 1919,
Gilman papers.
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After 1919 the predicament of the Gilman State Bank
paralleled the fate of other Montana banks,

These insti

tutions had borrowed and loaned to such an extent they
stayed above water because they floated on their own com
mercial paper.

This, however, was not good enough for

eastern organizations.

They desired only profitable re

turns on money invested in the West, and it proved an in
surmountable task for the Gilman bank to forestall these
companies for time to recover*
Responding to a request from a Minneapolis surety
company to pay off its deposit, C. W. Tewell replied:
"We realize that you are not in the loaning business and
that you have paid this money out and want it back.

We

believe also you can understand our situation here and
that payment at this time would work a severe hardship
on us.

We therefore are compelled to ask you to carry

this for us until f a l l . " ^
In the letter the Gilman Bank enclosed a $1,000 check
covering the payment on the principal and the interest on
the deposit.

This maneuver,

intended to persuade the com

pany to leave its deposit in the bank, caused the Gilman
officials to comment:

21

’’This i(3 a small payment but it rep-

Letter, Tewell to Harrison B. Martin, May 5* 1922,
Gilman papers.
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resents quite a little cash at this time.

We want to

state too that if consideration is shown in extending us
this needed time we will use every effort to clean this
up as rapidly as we c a n . " ^

It was a sad situation when

the bank had difficulty even paying the interest on a time
deposit, let alone paying back the entire amount of the
deposit.
The Gilman State Bank had reached such straits that
an abundance of letters continually flowed from the bank
to institutions outside of Montana requesting funds.
letters usually read:

These

"It is useless to call on our

Montana correspondents for cash so we feel obliged to
call on you to extend us a little credit for a short
23
time."
The changed attitude of one of the eastern investors
in Illinois brought the typical reply to the Gilman bank
officials:
I was able to deposit money in western banks for
a good many years as this money represented sur
plus funds which we did not need to use at that
time in our community.
1 always endeavored to let my friends in Montana
and the other western states know that these
were surplus funds which we might some time ^/sic/
have to use in our immediate vicinity, although
at that time I could' not see far enough ahead to
realize to what extent this might be necessary.
As a real matter of fact, I had to draw in all

22

Ibid.

21
Letter, Tewell to Lord, July 30, 1923, Gilman papers.
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my deposits with western banks* which at one
time amounted to between $4*000,000 and $5*000,000.
I don't want you to feel that we merely deserted
the ship in the west at the time you needed help
as we have never considered our deposits of money
on certificates quite in the same light as an
active banking relationship and I don't believe
that you so considered them."24
In March^l922* the Wells-Dickey Company,

in a similar

predicament, wrote to A. L. Bradley informing him of the
changed attitude of its investors:

"Some of them are assum

ing a threatening attitude... and it will be impossible to
hold them off any longer.

We regret it will be necessary

for us to start foreclosure on some loans, and the only
way to forestall such action will be for you to make good
at once.'1^
The persistence of the Wells-Dickey firm in collecting
overdue notes is displayed in a 1922 letter— this one from
a farmer at Riebling, 10 miles east of Gilman.

"I just

received a letter from Wells-Dickey Co. G t . Falls and they
can't wait eny longer for there money.

I git a letter

from them every time I go to the Post office giving me
Hell."

He requested the bank to "...fix things up with
as they Bother me to death.

^ L e t t e r , F. W. Woodruff to Tewell, Oct. 30* 1922,
Gilman papers.

25

Letter, R. J. Stallman to Bradley, March 10, 1922*
Gilman papers.
A Lfetter, C. A. Larson to the Gilman State Bank,
March 13* 1922* Gilman papers.
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The pressure of these surety firms prompted the
state Bank examiner to write the companies.

He stated:

"This department is informed that bonds are refused on
original application,

renewal of risks refused and bopds

terminated or cancelled on too short notice."

Further,

"...hope is held out that renewal will be forthcoming
until the last moment and finally refused; unreasonable
demands and requirements are made and impossible condi
tions imposed."

More importantly, the "...failure of

banks might be traced to refusal to renew at the last mo
ment, when as a matter of fact the company did not intend to renew from the very beginning." 2 7
Unlike these companies the Gilman State Bank was
not as quick to foreclose on local farmers and ranchers,
and was more willing to extend delinquent loan payments.
The bank foreclosed on a farm only when the owner was
in such a predicament that he was ready to file for bank
ruptcy.

In addition, it was not uncommon that the bank

extended a third or even fourth loan to those farmers who
needed money, only so he could go deeper into debt.
Immediate foreclosures of farms and ranches, rather
than continued extension of loans, was the simple solution.
However, the good of the community had to be considered

^ L e t t e r , L. Q. Skelton to the Gilman State Bank,
Nov. 30 1 1921', Gilman papers.

83
and bank officials thought about these people first,
rather than the welfare of the bank.

It is ironic that

to keep the town of Gilman strong Bradley depended on
the bank to show the leadership.

But it had to have

people— dependable and reliable workers, preferably—
to even maintain a town.

Consequently, Bradley had to

make a choice between his bank or Gilman*s homesteaders—
he chose to help the latter.
Had Bradley reacted like other community bankers,
and worried only about his bank, the state bank of Gilman
might have survived.

But, in this instance, Bradley

thought more about his town.
failed, but the town survived.

The bank in Augusta also
The bank officials and

directors did show concern for the farmers to whom they
loaned, but unlike Bradley, they placed more concern on
their bank.
In any case, it is illogical that either bank would
h^ve survived under the circumstances.

Two banks in an

area that supported no more than 1,500 people had no chance
for survival.

The population, combined with the agri

cultural and economic conditions of the time, makes it
improbable that even a single bank in the region would
have.stayed open.
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III

The third consideration of the b a n k fs loan experi
ence involved'the local farmers' pleas for aid.

The

good years preceding the drought did not necessitate
an excessive number of loan requests from local Gilman
ranchers.

The drought did not reach the Sun River area

until 1918 and farmers that borrowed money before that
time relied on the bank for only small loans.

After that

time out of state companies ceased to loan to western
farmers because of unstable collateral.

Local residents

then besieged the Gilman bank with loan requests.

Since

these homesteaders had begun farming on big hopes and
small pocketbooks they turned to the local bank for help.
The plight of these farmers is best summed up in
the 1919 edition of The Resources and Opportunities of
Montana.

The journal stated;

"It is not advisable to

locate on a homestead in any case unless the settler has
a sufficient supply of funds to carry him through.

For

a man with a family this should not be less than $2,000."
In a 1927 survey taken by the Experimental Station of

28Montana's Resources, 1919,

20.

28
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Montana State College it revealed that the typical
rancher in the Sun River Valley on a 100 acre plot
cleared $416 a year.
$1,433*

29

On a 160 acre claim he cleared

In neither case was the amount cleared anywhere

near the minimum $2,000 suggested.
The aniount increased, however,

for those who owned

more land, but even on the average 320 acre farm the
additional income was not enough to offset the staggering
drop in agricultural prices.

More importantly the small

income of the farmers made it financially impossible for
them to meet the loan payments due at their community
bank.
Compounding the difficulty of the farmers in meet
ing loan payments was the corresponding drop in

parity.

3°

"During the five years 1916-1920 Montana farm wheat
prices averaged 57 percent above parity."

However,

” ...

during the years 1922-1926, when bankruptcies were
heaviest, Montana wheat prices averaged 4 percent below

29 Agriculture on the Sun River Irrigation Pro.iect,
Bulletin 32l,
53~9
30

P a r i t y . This is a system of regulating prices of
farm commodities, usually by government price supports,
to provide farmers with the same purchasing price they
had in a selected base year.
Random House Dictionary of
the English Language, e d . by Jess S t e i n ( N e w Y o r k : R a n 
dom House Inc., 1967), 1049.
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parity.,TJ

The drop in wheat prices faster than the

drop in prices of commodities farmers bought placed im
possible burdens on the homesteaders.

Since there was

no increase in production the loss in net prices accom
panied the reduction in the farmers' incomes.
In June*1918* loans in the Gilman State Bank were
$151*000 and deposits were $1 31,000.^2

Two years later

on the June-1920 condition report loans reached the high
est ever— $237*000.
to $183*000.

Deposits increased by oyer $52*000

In that short time loans had increased

60 percent while deposits were up 40 percent.

In March

of that year overdue notes totaled $18,000 and all rated
as being slow.

There were no recordings in the doubt

ful or loss columns in the r e p o r t . ^
By September} 1921* even though the total amount of
loans dropped to $189*000, over one-quarter of all the

31
Montana Experiment Station, Montana Farm Bank
rup t ci e s , Bulletin 36O (Bozeman:
Montana State College*
1938),
4 8 . Hereafter cited as Montana Farm Bankrupt
cies, Bulletin 360.
32

Gilman Condition Repo r t . June 29* 1918.

33Ibid., June 3 0 , 1920.
"^Letter, h . S. MaGraw to the Gilman State Bank,
March 2* 1920, Gilman papers.

bank's loans were overdue— $54,000

Of that total

the list in the slow column was $36,0 0 0 ; doubtful re
payments were $4,000; and those considered as a total
loss reached $2,000— the latter was a conservative es
timate of unreclaimed l o a n s . ^

The remaining $12,000,

mostly loans less than three months overdue, were con
sidered as being subject to repayment.
Finally on November 27, 1923, the closing condition
report for the bank listed $196,000 in loans and dis
counts.

Of that figure $140,000 fell into the good column

$9,000 as doubtful for repayment; and $47,000 as a total
loss— this was nearly one-quarter of all the bank's loans.
After the bank's closure it became the responsibility of
the newly appointed receiver, George H. Minson, to collect
the overdue notes and those that would come due in the
f uture.
In a 1921 letter from the Banking Corporation of
Montana the company chastised these delinquent farm mort
gage borrowers in hopes of repayment.

nWe have been carry

^~*Gilman Condition R e p o r t . Sept. 6, 1921.
36
, Letter, L. Q. Skelton to the Gilman State Bank,
Sept. 15, 1921, Gilman papers.
37
papers.

Gilman Condition Report, Nov. 27, 1923, Gilman
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ing you for some time £si.cj at considerable expense and
this year we expect, and must have, an adjustment.”
i
Further,
..you perhaps owe your local bank, grocery,
hardware,

lumber dealers and others.

In making settlement,

please keep prominently in mind the fact that your farm,
your home, is the boss of your earning power.”
the company advised:

In ending

”The mortgage on your home, interest

on this mortgage and the taxes against these lands must be
taken care o f .” 3®
No one knew this better than the Gilman homesteaders,
but they could do nothing to alter the situation.

When

a farmer went bankrupt it was a personal admission of
his hopeless state of affairs.

This acted as a deterrent

for many of these people who had strong ambitions and
unusually intense personal pride.

Consequently, they

struggled on against great odds only to find too frequently
that in the end they were unable to repay their loans and
IQ
the creditors forced liquidation through foreclosure.0
To better understand this problem of bank loans a
study made by the Montana Experiment Station of five cen
tral Montana counties is extremely helpful

(Teton and

^8

Letter, The Banking Corporation of Montana to
delinquent farm mortgage borrowers, Aug. 5j 1921, Gil
man p a p e r s .
^ M o n t a n a Farm Bankruptcies, Bulletin 360,

9.
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Cascade counties included).

Made over a twenty-two year

period (1911-1933)> the study concluded that,

"...land

productivity and loan experience were closely related."
The report revealed:

"Loans were not successfully ad

justed to the productivity and debt-carrying capacity
of the farm— an indication that poor lands were greatly
overappraised while good lands were underappraised.
No where was this more correct than in the case of
the Gilman bank.

The bank's officers did make periodic

trips to local ranches and farms, but neither Bradley,
Abbey, nor Tewell possessed any real knowledge about wheat
farming or cattle ranching.

Bradley had spent several

years in North Dakota as a farmer, but this was during a
4

time when drought and falling prices seldom occurred.
The only real experience these men had in evaluating a
farm's capacity occurred during their association with the
bank.

They, like the homesteaders, knew nothing about dry

land farming or the raising of livestock under such condi
tions .
Another report undertaken by the Station to determine
the cause of farm bankruptcies reached a similar conclusion.

40

Montana Experiment Station, Farm Mortgage Loan Ex
perience in Central M o n t a n a , Bulletin 372 (Bozeman: M o n t 
ana State College, 1939),
2.
The five Montana counties
included in the survey were Cascade, Chouteau, Fergus,
Judith Basin and Teton.
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"The first and most important step towards a sounder loan
procedure is the determination of the productivity value
or true worth of lands based upon 3 scientific soil sur
vey and average yields and prices, to be used as the basis
for lending,
Here the problem rested for the bank never undertook
a survey of the land productivity in the region or adjusted
the appraisal of good and poor lands.

The b a n k ’s offi

cials made the majority of the loans based on the abilities
and character of the man.

The only majop consideration

taken at all on the land, naturally depended on whether
it could be irrigated.
From 1910 to the b a n k ’s failure in 1923* loans
greatly affected the operation of the state bank of Gil
man.

In the end it was this poor loan experience that

contributed significantly to the b a n k ’s closing.

Delin

quent farm loans, compounded by the demands of eastern
institutions for repayment, placed the bank in the middle
of two immovable forces.

Lack of experience by bank

officials in loaning in no way alleviated the problem
and also played an instrumental role in the b a n k ’s failure.

41

Montana Farm Bankruptcies. Bulletin 36O,

50*

CHAPTER IV
FINANCIAL FACTORS
OF THE BANK

I

The failure of the Gilman State Bank on November
2 8 , 1923j followed very closely the failure of other
banks in Montana.

The bank remained financially sound

until 1918, but after that time the drain on deposits
and the ^xtenion of loans caused a gradual decline in
the b a n k ’s stability.

This proved to be the same case

for the majority of the state’s banking institutions.
Ironically the rival Peoples Bank of Augusta closed
its doors on December 22, 1923, less than one month after
the bank in Gilman folded.

When examining certain as

pects of the Gilman b a n k ’s closure it would be foolish
to ignore the condition of the Peoples Bank in the
neighboring community.

Not only were these two banks

located in the same area, but they depended primarily
on the same regional economy.
The December 6, 1923 edition of the Augusta News
r e ported:
The Gilman State Bank, ’The Bank of Friendly
Service,’ failed to open its door for business
last Friday morning by action of the Board of
Directors. While it is claimed that this ac-
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tion was taken to protect the depositors and
that the bank will reopen and pay dollar for
dollar, it is the general opinion that the in
stitution is past all stage of redemption and
estimates as to its ability to pay out run as
low as ten cents on the dollar.
In retrospect,

three weeks later on December 27,

the same paper reported the Augusta b a n k ’s failure:
The Peoples Bank of Augusta was closed last
Saturday morning by order of the State Super
intendent of Banks after an examination by Co
E. Cleave.
The bank was closed after a most
strenuous effort on the part of directors to
keep it open in which effort a few men have sac
rificed much of both time and money.
A steady drain on the b a n k ’s resources since
the close of the Gilman bank caused its fail
ure.
Since that time oyer $25,000 have passed
out of the Augusta institution and to the last
moment local men were ready and willing to put
up their money to save the bank.
It is an awful blow to the community and will
not be felt to its fullest extent for some
time.
The bank will undoubtedly pay out d o l 
lar for dollar and the possibility of reorgan
izing is not abandoned.^
The closure of the Augusta and Gilman banks started
rumors of other bank failings in the valley.

Only five

weeks after the Augusta bank had closed its doors a no
tice of correction appeared in the Augusta N e w s :

^Augusta N e w s . Dec. 6, 1923*
2I b i d .. Dec. 2 7., 1923 .
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The News last week contained the announcement
that the 'State Bank of Simms expresses a
desire to discontinue its business and invites
its depositors to come in and get their m o n e y »'
Now it happens that there is no *State Bank of
Simms' or never has beenj the only bank at Simms
being the 'Sun River Valley State B a n k . 1 This
bank has no intention of quitting business.
We do not care to say where our information lead
ing to the publication of the item came from but
it was common talk about town the forepart of;
last week.
Rumors continued to spread and in one respect the
banks themselves were to blame.

Banks used to close at

every opportunity, this was especially the case for holi
days.

Bank officials,

for example, usually hung a sign

on the door that said--"Bank Closed"— and in finer print
"For Washington's Birthday."

After the banks started to

close people passed these buildings and read the sign
in the window— "Bank Closed"— and that was as far as they
went.

This immediately started a run on the bank.

For

that reason banks today generally announce— "This Bank
will observe Washington's Birthday."^
The failure of these two upper Sun River banks greatly
affected the people in the region, both financially and
emotionally.

In addition to this fact the failure of the

^I b i d . . Jan. 31, 1924.
The Sun River Valley State
Bank received its charter on June 10, 1913, and volun
tarily liquidated on March 1, 1937.
4

Tape, Homer J. Wellman.
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Gilman State Bank and its rival Augusta bank can be con
sidered good examples of Montana banks that folded during
the 1 9 2 0 ,s.

Both banks fall into categories that are

representative of the majority of the state’s commercial
banks that closed during this era.
The Peoples Bank of Augusta and the Gilman State Bank
were state rather than national banks.

From 1921-1925

’’...the percentage of state bank failures was higher than
those for national banks.”5
In four of those five years the ratio of state banks
failing as compared with national banks was two to one.
Also, neither bank belonged to the Federal Reserve System;
non-member banks failed more often than member banks.
Size in determining bank failures was another impor
tant factor.

For state banks that failed the average

capitalization in Montana was $36,000; for banks that did
7 not fail, capitalization was $47,5 0 0 .
The Augusta bank,
upon its failure, had $40,000 in capital stock, while that
of the Gilman bank was $25*000.

8

The banks in the state

with capital of $20,000- $ 30,000 represented almost one-half

■^Elliott, ’’Commercial Bank Failures,
^ I b i d .,

1920-1926,”

19.

22.

7I b i d .
8

State Examiners Report for the State of M o n t a n a , June3
192 2.
Hereafter cited as State Examiners Report (with given
year).

95

of all the bank failures in Montana.

Ninety-five of the

214 banks that failed fell into this category.9
Total resources of a bank were also an important
guide when comparing Mo n t a n a ’s financial disaster— on
the average, local state banks that failed had resources
totaling $563>000.

Those that did not fail had re

sources of $983,000.10

The Augusta bank had slightly

more resources on June 30, 1922, than did the Gilman
State Bank;

$323,000 to $264,000 respectively.'*7'*'

Fifteen

months later in September 1923 the Gilman b a n k ’s re
sources dropped drastically to $207,000.'*'^
Amounts of total time and demand deposits were use
ful in measuring bank closures.
report of the State Examiner,

The twenty-?-seventh annual

released in June,1922, re

ported that the Peoples Bank of Augusta maintained only
$128,000, while the Gilman bank totaled $143,000.'*'^
The average for those state banks that failed was
$205,000.'*'^ In both cases, the Gilman and Augusta b a n k s ’

9Elliott,

"Commercial Bank Failures,

1920-1926,"

23.

10Ibid.

11

State Examiners Rep o r t , Junej192 2.

l 2Gilman Condition R e p o r t , Sept. 14, 1923.
13

State Examiners R e p o r t , June^l922.

"^Elliott,

"Commercial Bank Failures,

1920-1926,"

23.

deposits were considerably lower than other failing banks.
”5ince a bank primarily serves its local area, the
location of failing and non-failing banks is an important
part of the failure pattern.

Generally, failing banks

were located in smaller communities--58 percent of Montana
bank failures occurred in communities of less than 500
population.”

1c

At the time of the two b a n k s 1 failures

neither community could claim a population much over 5 0 0 .
In addition, the location of these two banks east
of the Continental Divide plaped them in an area dependent
on agriculture, as compared with western Montana that
relied on mining and forestry.

’’The area in Montana east

of the Continental Divide experienced the failure of 56.4
percent of its banks during the 1920-1926 period,
area west of the Divide,

in the

38.5 percent of the banks failed.

Thus, those banks in eastern Montana, dependent on an
unstable agricultural economy, were more susceptible to
failure than their counterparts across the Divide.
The length a bank had been established in a commu
nity represented still another determining factor lending
keys to the investigation of Montana's commercial bank
failures.

Of the 214 banks that collapsed,

73 received

charters from the state in the years 1910-1914*

17

was over pne-third of all the banks; the Gilman and

15Ibid.,

25-6.

l 6I b i d ..

76.

17I b i d . .

27.

This

Augusta banks fit into this category.

Such a comparison

revealed that "...failing banks were not as well estab
lished and were newer institutions than non-failing banks.
A final consideration when comparing the Gilman and
Augusta bank failures with other Montana banks deals with
the dependence on a local one-crop economy and the lack
of diversification.

The two Sun River Valley banks in

times of prosperity were better off than most banks.
Since the economy of the Sun River area was almost equally
divided between livestock and grain crops, good revenue
in one area offset failing prices in the other.
However, this was not the case after 1917, for both
wheat and livestock prices plummeted.

Farmers who had

borrowed money to buy new equipment for harvesting could
not depend on adequate returns from the sale of their
cattle

(and in some cases sheep) to cover their losses.

These men continued to borrow from the Augusta and Gilman
banks in hopes of returning to more prosperous days.

18Ibid

.
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Excluding the Augusta Bank, many financial factors
concerning deposits greatly influenced the failure of
the state bank in Gilman.

First of all, the most impor

tant aspect of deposits when examining the b a n k ’s fin
ancial status was the loan to deposit ratio.
The majority
1
of the banks that failed during this period had loan to
deposit ratios between 100 and 200 percent.

This trend

was more pronounced in the small country banks than it
was in the urban banjcs .

The Gilman bank was no exception

in this matter.
The years 1910 to 1916 revealed a slow increase in
loans with a proportionate increase in depos its.-^9

19

Dur-

TABLE 7
Gilman State Bank (1910-1923)
LOANS TO TOTAL DEPOSITS RATIO

Year
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923

Lo ans
$ 13,701.45
48,571*76
48,392.34
56,814.62
74,68-7.65
77,795.93
75,975.41
124,104.09
150,904.06
199,901.50
236,913.32
186,518.80
213,793.25
202,869.67

Total
Deposits
$ 23,758*81
37,030.65
42,044.69
44,438.92
70,136.89
57,725.03
76,321.55
120,653.15
131,127.07
202,339.56
183,470.32
145,049.52
143,066.57
119,465.31

Loan to
Total Deposits
Ratio
.58
1.31
1.15
1.29
1.07
1.35
1.00
1.02
1.15
.99
1.30
1.29
1.50
1.67

Gilman Condition Reports, June reports 1910-1923*
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ing this seven year period the loan—deposit ratio averaged
about 120 percent.

The picture changed, however, in 1918

when the drought reached the Gilman area and loans in the
community*s bank increased by over $25>000.

Deposits

also increased t*ut not at the rapid rate that loans followed.
This caused a steady increase in the loan-deposit ratio.
In 1918 optimism prevailed in the minds of the bank
officials.

They disregarded sound banking practices

by over-extending the b a n k ’s loans.

These men believed

the drought would not continue and the Gilman bank would
regain its losses in future years.
Better times did not return and by 1919 loans
reached nearly $200,0 0 0 .
ure--$202,000.

Deposits were over that fig-

The following year the ratio jumped to

130 percent and from that time on the bank could not
halt the run on loans.

Loans increased $37^000 while

deposits fell by $20,0 0 0 .
From 1920 to 1923 the b a n k ’s loan-deposit ratio
remained over 120 percent.

Although loans decreased

after 1920, deposits did not increase enough to effec
tively help the b a n k ’s poor financial condition.

In

fact, from 1922 to 1923 the bank lost nearly $24^000
in deposits; the loan to total deposits ratio reached
the highest in the b a n k ’s history--l67 percent.
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From 1910-1917 the individual deposits to total
9.0

deposits ratio remained relatively stable.*

However,

TABLE 8
Gilman State Bank (1910-1923)
INDIVIDUAL DEPOSITS TO
TOTAL DEPOSITS RATIO

Year
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923

Total
Deposits

See
Table 7
— -

Individual
Deposits
$ 23,183.81
36,039.27
35,682.54
40,972.81
55,349.44
45,225.78
44,499.29
72,707.61
61,288.54
84,659.43
56,934.61
5.1,709.36
59,459.56
24,061.01

Individual Depo
its to Total De
posits
Ratio
.97
.97
.85
.92
.79
.78
.59
.60
.47
.42
.31
.36
.41
.12

Gilman Condition Reports. June reports 1910-1923.
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as in the case of the loan-deposit ratio, the years
after 1918 showed a significant change.

In 193 8 the

individual deposits total deposits ratio dropped 13
percent from the preceding year.

The next two years

showed a steady decline, but by 1921 a reversal occurred
and it looked as if the bank might recover.

In 1923*

though, the percentage of individual deposits to total
deposits dropped by over two-thirds
12 percent).

(from 41 percent to

This meant a monetary loss of over $25*000--

a loss too great from which to recover.
Another consideration in determining the b a n k ’s
failure was the adequacy of capital funds.

To determine

this a ratio of capital funds to total deposits is com
piled.

"Conventional thought during the 1920’s maintained

that a 10 percent minimum was necessary for operating
s a f e t y .

This rule is illusory, however, for the

majority of Montana banks in 1921 and 1922 were in excess of the ratio by 20 percent.

22

In compiling such a ratio the figures revealed a
failure of the stockholders to maintain adequate capital
to cover the liabilities in the bank.

21

This capital was

Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures, 1920— 1926,”

22Ibid.,

67.

65.
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used "to establish confidence, and if this confidence
/yiasj disturbed, the amount of capital

not suffi

cient to offset rapid deposit withdrawals."2^
The Gilman bank in comparison with other Montana
banks from 1918— 1923 had a very similar ratio.24

From

1918 to 1922 the ratio was under 20 percent, but consid
erably oyer the minimum 10 percent.

The rapid withdrawal

of money in 1923 caused a dramatic change in the capital
to total deposits ratio.

That year the bank recorded an

increase of 4 percent from the previous year--the ratio
reached 21 percent.

The inadequate deposits in the Gil

man Bank after 1918 caused the high ratio to be recorded.

2 ^I b i d .,

66.

24

TABLE 9
Gilman State Bank (1918-1923)
CAPITAL FUNDS TO TOTAL
DEPOSITS RATIO

Year
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923

Total
Deposits

Capital
Funds

See
Table 7
_

$ 25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000

Capital Funds to
Total Deposits
Ratio
.19
.12
.14
.17
.17
.21

Gilman Condition R eports, June reports 1918-1923

10 3
Ironically* in 1912 the bank purchased a book
entitled How to Increase a Bank*s D e p osits.
proved to be of little value* though*
and his bank.

The book

for A. L. Bradley

"In 128 pages* /the book/ delineated

eighteen ways to advertise. But in spite of the do-ityourself approach aimed at increasing deposits, the
bank was better at loaning money than at attracting depositors."

2 Si

A final consideration of the bank's failure deal
ing with deposits concerned the comparison of total
deposits to total resources.

The higher the proportion

of ^total7 deposits to total resources, the higher the
leverage factor and* therefore* the profitability to
the bank owners."

26

In the case of those banks that failed the ratio of
deposits to resources was generally low.
can be made for the Gilman State Bank.

The same case
After 1919 the

b a n k fs total deposits were in a continual decline and

^^Toole*
26

"Montana:

A Twentieth Century Portrait,"

Elliott* "Commercial Bank Failures* 1920-1926,"

52.
68.

10 4
so was its deposits to resources ratio.

27

In 1922 the

ratio fell to 54 percent and the last year of the bank's
operation the ratio dropped to 50 percent.

This compared

with the state's 1923 ratio of 75 percent for all banks
nQ
and a national ratio of 81 p e r c e n t /
The profitability
for the bank's owners reached such a low point that the
only consideration was the bank's closure.

27

TABLE 10
Gilman State Bank (1918-1923)
TOTAL DEPOSITS TO
RESOURCES RATIO

Total
Deposits

Year
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923

See
Table 7

Resources
$185,750.43
249,486.50
274,649.18
235,049.52
263,973.21
237,867.95

Total Deposits to
Resources
Ratio
.71
.81
.67
.62
.54
.50

Gilman Condition Reports. June reports 1918-1923*
'28

Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures, 1920-1926,"

70.
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III
Other financial factors besides deposits also
played major roles in the collapse of the state bank
in Gilman:

dividends paid, the surplus account fund,

bills payable,

and the state’s reserve requirement for

all commercial banks.

The years before 1920 did not

show any significant change in the amount of yearly
dividends paid.
percent dividend,

In 1916 stockholders received a 15
in 1917 and 1918 a 10 percent dividend,

and 15 percent in both 1919 and 1920.

That last year

$3>750 in dividends went to shareholders at $15.40 a
s h a r e .^
After January 20, 1920, the bank did not pay a
single dividend.

In 1922 a letter from C. W. Tewell to

one of the b a n k ’s stockholders explained the predicament:
We did not declare any dividend ./this year?
The
directors thought it wise not to declare any u n 
til times looked better.
In view of the fact
that we had very light crops during the last
two or three years, together with the slump in
prices on stock and grain, it has made it neces
sary to carry a good many of our customers with
principal and interest.3°
The last sentence lends credence to the problem the
bank faced after 1920.'

Since the Gilman bank foreclosed

29
7Gilman Condition R eports. June reports 1916-1923.
30
papers.

Letter, Tewell to Reynolds, March 6 , 1922, Gilman
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on only a small number of farmers Bradley and his asso
ciates continued to extend credit to farmers and ranch
ers.

At the same time they did not force payment on d e 

linquent loans.

This caused a further breakdown in the

financial spectrum.
The bank did not have enough money to pay the in
terest on money borrowed from eastern banks.

These banks

in turn received pressure from their own stockholders
to force payment.

This resulted in eastern banks pleading

with Bradley to meet his commitments.

Bradley pleaded

with his farmers and the latter pleaded with mother nature
for relief.
A letter from the Wells-Dickey Company in Minneapolis
illustrated the problem of all parties concerned.

,,I s n tt

there some way you can put a stick of dynamite under
Heckman Bros, so they can produce some money soon?

The

insurance company to whom we have sold this loan is de
manding ah early settlement."

In concluding the firm

underscored future action that would be taken.

"We are

fearful, unless the Heckmans get busy and make this p ay
ment at an early date, the insurance company will in
struct us to commence immediate foreclosure.

We should

very much dislike to see this happen because it would
cause additional expense and embarrassment to the Heckmans,
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as well as to all of u a . " ^
To compound matters the bankers and farmers were
under pressure from a different source as a 1923 letter
from Tewell to Lord denoted:
The winter wheat is practically ripe here now
and its harvest is commencing this week.
Farm
ers coming in for repairs and twine have been
told by the implement dealers that everything
is cash on delivery.
A representative of the
International Harvester Co. was in the bank to
day arid told us that this is the case all over
the state.^2
The situation in no way made it any easier for the
Gilman farmers.

Such a restriction for purchasing goods

forced the homesteaders to seek additional funds from
the bank so they could meet their daily operating expenses.
"The surplus account is of some importance as a
reflection of book earnings.

Profits not distributed to
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owners are eventually charged to the surplus account." J
Here again the Gilman bank is an excellent bank to ex
amine .
The five years preceding 192 2 the bank religiously
placed money in the surplus fund.

The seven thousand

31

Letter, Wells-Dickey to the Gilman State Bank,
Jan. 12, 1922, Gilman papers.
32
33

Letter, Tewell to Lord, July 3 0 , 1923; Gilman papers.
Elliott,

"Commercial Bank Failures, 1920-1926,"

65.

10 S
dollars used those years,

added to the previous $3*000

brought the total to $10,000.

In 1922 and 1923 the

bank ceased to operate with a profit and operated in the
red.

There was no excess profit,
Tk
could be placed in surplus,''

consequently no money

TABLE II
Gilman State Bank (1910-1923)
SURPLUS ACCOUNT
Year
•1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923

Added to
Account

Total in
Account

_

—

—

—

—

—

—

$ 1,000
2,000
—

1,000
1,000
1,500
1,500
2,000
—

-

$ 1,000
3,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,500
8,000
10,000
10,000

-

Gilman Condition Reports3 June reports 1910-1923,
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The amount of bills payable the bank possessed was
also an indication of the institution*s stability.

From

1910 to 1916 the bills payable column remained relatively
clear.^

After that the bank increased its bills payable

until it reached a peak in 1921 of $55*000.

The next

two years the bank recorded reductions of $15*000 arid
$13*000, but they were of no great consequence to halt
the failing of the bank.
At the time the majority of Montana*s banks failed
there was a state reserve requirement for both national
and state banks.

In a circular sent to all the banks

TABLE 12
Gilman State Bank (1910-1923)
BILLS PAYABLE
Year
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923

Bills Paya
__

-

,

-

$ 10,000
12,500
_

10,000
20,000
15,000
52,500
55*000
39,900
27,000

Gilman Condition Reports, June reports 1910-1923•

110
in the state the bank Superintendent stated the reserve
policy:

"Every bank, except a reserve bank, shall main

tain at all times a reserve of at least ten per centum
of its deposit liabilities."8^
The problem of maintaining the required reserve
proved to be a mammoth one for Montana banks.

A. L. Brad

ley in response to a letter from the Wells-Dickey Cor
poration touched upon that problem.

"You understand as

well as we that conditions all over the state are not
good and it is keeping the banks busy to keep up the re
quired r e s e r v e . " ^
From 1918 to 1920 the Gilman bank maintained a very
adequate reserve in proportion to its total d e p osits.88

8°Letter, State Department of Banking to all Montana
banks, April 23> 1920, Gilman papers.
37

*
Letter, Bradley to A. P. Morris, April 6 , 1921,
Gilman papers.
38

TABLE 13
Gilman State Bank (1918-1923)
RESERVE TO TOTAL
DEPOSITS RATIO

Year
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923

Total
Depos its
See
Table 7
_
'

Reserve
$ 16,888.98
31,598.35
21,354-96
1 5 ,831.16
16,291.12
7,274-55

Reserve to Total
Deposits Ratio
.13
.15
.12
.11
.11
.06

Gilman Condition Reports, June reports 1918-1923*

Ill
However, in 1921 the reserve to total deposits ratio
dropped to 11 percent and remained at that level the
following year.

It could not be increased and fell

drastically below the required 10 per cent.

On the June

condition report of 1923 the bank recorded a ratio of
only 6 percent.

Five months later on the final report

of November 27, the day before the bank closed, the re
serve to deposits ratio remained u n c h a n g e d , ^
On November 28, 1923, the board of directors of the
Gilman bank considered the problem of the b a n k ’s reserve
and acted accordingly.

’’Realizing the reserve must be

built up to the legal requirements the matter of a stock
assessment was discussed.

Inability of the stockholders

to place new money in the bank, made an assessment value
less.

The prospect of closing the bank was taken up for

discussion as it was the sense of the meeting the bank
could not hope to build up its reserve.

Naturally the

motion was made, seconded and unanimously carried to
close the bank.”^
The Gilman State Bank was a financially sound in
stitution from 1910 to 1917.

During this period it ade

quately served, the needs of the farmers and ranchers
in the Gilman area.

39

The bank did not secure a sizable

Ibid., Nov. 27, 1923.

^ M i n u t e s , Nov. 28, 1923, Gilman papers.

112
profit but cleared enough each year so that an adequate
dividend could be awarded the stockholders.

When the

grain growers and stockmen prospered so did the Gilman
bank •
After the drought hit central Montana the small
bank suffered along with its depositors.
at a rapid rate.

Loans increased

Deposits fell and caused the loan-

deposit ratio to soar.

The bills payable could not be

effectively reduced and money ceased to be placed in
the surplus account.

Most importantly the bank's capi

tal stock was not increased nor was its reserves.

The

only alternative for the directors was to go into receiver
ship in hopes of reopening the bank at a later date.
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CONCLUSION

The closure of the Gilman State Bank in 1923
epitomized the failure of other Montana banks during
the 1920*s.

It was a small country bank run by in

experienced personnel.

It depended on homesteaders

who lacked knowledge about western farming procedures.
Worst of all, the bank was located in an area that
relied on a marginal economy.
The dry years after 1917 caused a chain reaction
of events.

Falling agricultural prices forced Montana

farmers to seek aid from their local banks.

The banks

in turn requested help from their correspondent banks
in the East.

These institutions granted the requests

until their stockholders demanded repayment of the loans.
This reversed the cycle, climaxed by the failure of
hundreds of Montana banks and the bankruptcy of thou
sands of the s t a t e ’s farmers.
The Gilman bank was representative of this failure.
Continual requests for loans from the local homesteaders
caused a steady increase in the loan-deposit ratio.
bills payable could not be reduced.

The

This forced the

b a n k ’s president to seek additional help from eastern
correspondents.

When this help was refused the Gilman
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bank could not maintain an adequate reserve and meet
its financial commitments.

Since other banks followed

this procedure the collapse of the Gilman bank can be
considered a typical example of a Montana bank failure.
The story of the Gilman bank is also unique because
it involved the formation and collapse of a whole com
munity.

A. L. Bradley built the town of Gilman in con

junction with the Great Northern Railroad.

When the

bank failed and the railroad was extended to Augusta in
1923, Gilman residents deserted their community.

They

depended so much on Bradley and his bank that when either
faltered the whole town suffered.
The town of Gilman is but a memory today.

The bank

building still stand^ but the only sounds heard on
main street are the rustle of the tumbleweeds and the
whistle of the wind.

In its glory the community aspired

to be the center of the Sun River Valley.

It was led

by an ambitiouis man who was outdone only by the fierce
competition with nature— a battle few men could hope
to w i n .
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